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ELEPHANT IN THE BOARDROOM?:  
COUNTING THE VOTE IN CORPORATE 
ELECTIONS 
While corporate elections are not perfectly parallel to civic 
elections . . . notions of what a fair election means and entails do inescapably 
carry over . . . . It is troubling . . . if the side in control of the levers of power 
employs them . . . to coerce its opposition . . . .  One need not assume bad faith 
on the part of incumbents to foresee . . . the prospects for unfairness; honest men 
seeking their (disputable) vision of what is best, if not bound-in by rules, are 
capable of gross impositions. Thus, it offers cold comfort that the law will 
assume that directors are acting in good faith.  Where the franchise is involved a 
special obligation falls upon courts to review with care action that impinges 
upon legitimate election activities.1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
After a tense proxy fight for control of Yahoo Inc., election results 
announced at the August 1, 2008, annual meeting showed the incumbent 
board of directors remained in control.2  Yahoo announced that 
Chairman Roy Bostock received a 79.5% favorable vote, CEO Jerry Yang 
85.4% favorable, and the next day the Wall Street Journal reported that 
“[s]hareholders overwhelmingly endorsed the board.”3  The six-month 
run-up to the annual meeting had been tumultuous:  it began with an 
unsolicited buyout offer from Microsoft on February 1, followed by on-
again, off-again negotiations with Microsoft, the unwelcome intervention 
of Carl Icahn, a “just vote no” proxy campaign mounted by dissident 
shareholders, and a share price that had roller-coastered from about $20 
to more than $33 and back to $20.4 
The Yahoo board’s sense of relief was short-lived because an 
institutional investor asked Broadridge Financial Solutions, the 
                                                 
1 Stahl v. Apple Bancorp, Inc., Civ. A. No. 11510, 1990 WL 114222 at *5 (Del. Ch. Aug. 9, 
1990) (holding, despite the dicta quoted, that under Unocal analysis a board’s defenses 
against a takeover bid were reasonable in light of the threat).  Chancellor Allen stated 
further that “assessment of the reasonably foreseeable consequences . . . on legitimate 
election activities, made as of the time that the board acted . . . is relevant for a 
determination whether the action was authorized and whether it constituted a breach of 
duty of loyalty.”  Id. at *6. 
2 Jessica E. Vascellaro, Yahoo Shareholders Endorse Board, WALL ST. J., Aug. 2, 2008, at B6, 
available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB121761996994605499.html. 
3 Id. 
4 See Jessica E. Vascellaro & Matthew Karnitschnig, Yahoo Will Add Icahn to its Board, 
WALL ST. J., July 22, 2008, at B2, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/ 
SB121664028755469981.html (including a table that concisely summarizes the key events 
leading up to Yahoo’s annual meeting.  Id. 
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independent vote-tabulator Yahoo had employed, to check the totals.5  
The investor, who along with a related fund, controlled about 16% of 
Yahoo’s outstanding stock, strongly doubted whether support for the 
incumbent board was as high as news reports indicated.6  After checking 
the totals, Broadridge and Yahoo announced a corrected vote count on 
August 5, revealing a miscount amounting to about 20% of the total vote, 
with roughly twice as many votes withheld from the chairman and CEO 
as first reported.7  The recount did not change the outcome of the 
election, but shareholders’ view of the board’s performance evidently fell 
short of overwhelming endorsement.8 
The events at Yahoo were not unique.9  For two and one-half months 
after the June 2008 annual meeting of CSX Corp., the incumbent board 
                                                 
5 Jessica E. Vascellaro, Yahoo Shareholder Questions Vote on CEO, WALL ST. J., Aug. 5, 
2008, at B6, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB121788630096211373.html. 
6 Id. 
7 Benjamin Pimentel & Dan Gallagher, Yahoo Board Vote Count Sharply Revised, 
MARKETWATCH, Aug. 5, 2008, http://www.marketwatch.com/news/story/votes-against-
yahoo-board-much/story.aspx?guid={91D5D9F5-AC7B-4F60-9B08-69FF5A156875}&dist= 
msr_6; Jessica E. Vascellaro, Yahoo Vote-Counting Error Overstated Support for Yang, WALL ST. 
J., Aug. 6, 2008, at B6.  Analysis revealed the source of the error was a truncated total on a 
computer-generated report.  Scott M. Fulton III, Huge Correction: More Opposition to Yahoo’s 
Yang than First Tabulated, BETA NEWS (Aug. 6, 2008), http://www.betanews.com/article/ 
Huge_correction_More_opposition_to_Yahoos_Yang_than_first_tabulated/1218038502 
(candidates who received votes totaling a nine-digit number “had votes removed from 
their ‘against’ column and moved to their ‘for’ column.  . . . Shareholder votes were 
tabulated on paper”). 
8 Pimentel & Gallagher, supra note 7. 
9 See In re Waddell & Reed Financial, Inc., No. Civ. A. 4602-CC (Del. Ch., June 12, 2009) 
(ordering an inspector of election to reopen the vote and accept previously omitted votes of 
approximately 3.2 million shares of Waddell & Reed after a proxy advisory firm failed to 
transmit votes because of a technical error).  See generally Dale A. Oesterle & Alan R. 
Palmiter, Judicial Schizophrenia in Shareholder Voting Cases, 79 IOWA L. REV. 485, 510–11 
(1994): 
The leaky dam of proxy tabulation burst in the 1993 proxy season 
when various institutional investors blew the whistle on Automatic 
Data Processing (ADP) [now Broadridge], a tabulation firm that 
handles over seventy percent of all corporate proxy solicitations. 
Several investors claimed [Broadridge] had not tallied their proxies in 
a “just vote no” campaign against Paramount Communications. The 
Paramount miscount was only the tip of the iceberg. During the 
solicitation period before the 1993 spring annual meetings, 
[Broadridge] had experienced significant difficulties: Proxy materials 
were sent out late or not at all; [Broadridge] received proxy tabulations 
late or not at all, causing several firms to struggle to meet quorum 
requirements or to postpone meetings; electronic tabulation systems 
failed to function; and proxy solicitors had to solicit proxies several 
times. 
Id. 
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battled two hedge funds, which together controlled about 20% of CSX’s 
voting shares, before a court decision placed four insurgent director 
candidates on CSX’s board.10  In the April 2008 election at Washington 
Mutual (“WaMu”), votes cast by brokers, rather than owners, 
determined the incumbent board’s re-election.11  In the 2005 merger of 
Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc. with Shire Pharmaceuticals Group PLC, 
some Transkaryotic shareholders, alleging inaccurate tabulation of votes, 
disputed whether the merger had been validly approved.12 
The dirty secret is that when shareholders vote in a corporate 
election, nothing assures an accurate vote count—as one investment 
manager observed, “nobody is really penalized if they don’t do their 
job.”13  The problem is this:  corporate elections are supposed to 
                                                 
10 Alex Roth, Vote ‘08: CSX vs. Activists, WALL ST. J., June 25, 2008, at C3; Alex Roth, In 
CSX Proxy, Funds Claim Victory in Close Board Vote, WALL ST. J., June 26, 2008, at C1; Heidi 
N. Moore, CSX, TCI Count Evokes a Classic, WALL ST. J., July 24, 2008, at C3; CSX Announces 
Final Voting Results for 2008 Annual Meeting of Shareholders, company news release (July 31, 
2008), available at http://investors.csx.com/ (follow “News Releases,” then “2008” 
hyperlinks); David Glovin, CSX Loses Appeal to Block TCI From Winning Two Seats (Update2), 
Sept. 15, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=aLBL61SRPxe 
0&dbk; CSX Corp. v. Children’s Inv. Fund Mgmt. (UK) LLP, 562 F. Supp. 2d 511 (S.D.N.Y. 
2008), aff’d 292 F. App’x 133 (2d Cir. 2008) (litigating whether irregularities in proxy 
disclosures and the differences between shares and equity swaps should disqualify the 
hedge funds’ proxies).  Less than a year later, the hedge funds had sold their CSX shares, 
which had lost about fifty percent of their value, and relinquished their board positions.  
Alex Roth & Cassell Bryan-Low, Fund Sells CSX Shares in Wake of Proxy Fight, WALL ST. J., 
Apr. 29, 2009, at A24. 
11 Jeff Nash, Broker Vote Zaps Shareholder Might, FINANCIAL WEEK (Apr. 28, 2008), 
http://www.financialweek.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20080428/REG/694771377. 
Financial Week reported “[n]one of WaMu’s 13 directors received a majority of no votes, 
although shareholders withheld 40% or more of all votes from two of them . . . .” and 
“broker votes [had] counted for more than 19% of the votes cast in WaMu’s 2007 director 
election.”  Id.  The article noted that brokers usually vote for incumbent management and 
“these ‘phantom’ votes can provide management with a handicap of up to 20% in 
elections.”  Id.  Official vote totals allow an inference that the broker vote may have been 
one-fourth of the total vote.  See Washington Mutual, Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 
94 (Aug. 11, 2008).  See also Shamrock Holdings of Cal., Inc. v. Iger, 2005 WL 5756479 at *1, 
n.7 (Del.Ch. June 6, 2005) (revealing that Disney’s CEO Michael Eisner would not have 
been elected without “for” votes from brokers—counting broker votes, 45.4% were 
withheld, but 54.4% of shareholder-instructed shares were withheld from Eisner); infra note 
100 (in uncontested director elections, brokers may vote their customers’ shares if 
shareholders do not provide voting instructions). 
12 In re Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc., 954 A.2d 346, 355 (Del. Ch. 2008).  Although the 
inspector of election certified that Transkaryotic shareholders had approved the merger by 
a margin of 2.6%, evidence showed genuine issues of material fact as to irregularities in 
validating and counting certain proxies, involving more votes than the margin by which 
the merger was approved.  Id. at 375–76, 378. 
13 Brandes Institute, Proxy Voting: Making Sure the Vote Counts, October 2003, 
http://www.brandes.com/Institute/Documents/Proxy%20Voting%20092903.pdf, at 5.  
See also Meagan Thompson-Mann, Voting Integrity: Practices for Investors and the Proxy 
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legitimate directors’ power—and, by extension, the way our economic 
system works—but real legitimacy depends on a voting process that is 
fair and accurate.14 
This Note focuses on the curious absence of accountability for 
accurately counting votes in corporate elections; it assumes—quite apart 
from the spirited debate concerning the proper role of shareholder 
voting in corporate governance—that any time an election is called, 
voters are entitled to nothing less than an accurate count of legitimately 
cast votes.  Throughout, unless otherwise specified, the term “election” 
refers to any process in which shareholders vote—equally to the election 
of directors and to voting on a merger or charter amendment.  Delaware 
corporation law, the most thoroughly developed body of law on rights of 
shareholders and the body of law applicable to more corporations than 
any other, provides the legal framework.15 
Part II first reviews the Delaware corporation law germane to the 
discussion of counting the vote in corporate elections.16  Second, it 
examines the increasing incidence of contested and close corporate 
elections, which has exposed weaknesses in the mechanisms and 
governing law for counting the vote.17  Third, it reviews fiduciary duties 
under Delaware corporate law, which frame any question of 
accountability for conducting the voting process fairly.18  Fourth, it 
discusses how the modern practice of holding shares “in street name” 
complicates the mechanics of conducting a corporate election.19  Fifth, it 
                                                                                                             
Industry 11 (Yale School of Management, Millstein Center for Corporate Governance and 
Performance, Policy Briefing No. 2, working draft, June 2008), available at 
http://millstein.som.yale.edu/2008%2006%2005%20voting%20integrity2.pdf (noting that 
consequences of miscast or lost votes to shareholders and intermediaries can be financial or 
reputational, including loss of clients). 
14 Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659 (Del. Ch. 1988) (“The shareholder 
franchise is the ideological underpinning upon which the legitimacy of directorial power 
rests.”).  An alternative view is that nowadays “voting by shareholders is best explained as 
error correction of managers rather than as an inherent shareholder right to participate.”  
Robert B. Thompson & Paul H. Edelman, Corporate Voting, 62 VAND. L. REV. 129, 141 (2009).  
But accepting this alternative view arguendo, surely a vote could be efficacious to correct 
managers’ errors only if it is counted accurately. 
15 William T. Allen, Jack B. Jacobs & Leo E. Strine Jr., Function over Form: A Reassessment 
of Standards of Review in Delaware Corporation Law, 56 BUS. LAW. 1287, 1288 (2001) 
(Delaware’s law of business organization is of paramount importance in establishing U.S. 
pre-eminence in facilitating economic welfare). 
16 See infra Part II.A. 
17 See infra Part II.B. 
18 See infra Part II.C. 
19 See infra Part II.D–E. 
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briefly examines two possible ways to work around or reduce the 
complexity with technology.20 
Part III analyzes, first, the legal and economic reasons why both 
directors’ and shareholders’ governance powers deserve protection, and 
second, the inevitability of errors in the complex proxy-handling system 
that has evolved around existing legal presumptions and institutional 
economic interests.21  Third, it evaluates how much technology could 
alleviate errors and identifies obstacles to implementing technical 
solutions.22  Fourth, it examines biases inherent in current proxy-
handling procedures and legal rules.23  Part IV proposes a doctrine, 
consistent with established Delaware precedents, to strengthen fiduciary 
accountability for an accurate vote count in the corporate election 
process.24 
II.  BACKGROUND 
The expectation that votes legitimately cast in an election should be 
counted accurately is intrinsic to fundamental notions of democracy:  
“the elector’s right . . . is not only that to cast his ballot but that to have it 
honestly counted.”25 
This Part presents background information concerning the legal 
context of corporate elections.  It begins with a summary of relevant 
Delaware statutes and case law, followed by an examination of reasons 
why contested corporate elections occur more frequently than in years 
past.  Third, it catalogues the standards of review for corporate directors’ 
fiduciary duties (where any accountability for more accurate elections 
                                                 
20 See infra Part II.F. 
21 See infra Part III.A–B. 
22 See infra Part III.C. 
23 See infra Part III.D. 
24 See infra Part IV. 
25 United States v. Saylor, 322 U.S. 385, 388 (1944) (reversing lower court’s ruling that 
stuffing a ballot-box in an election for a U.S. senator was not a criminal offense under 
federal law).  Despite disagreement whether regulation of elections is a question of federal 
or state jurisdiction, justices agreed there is a close association between the right to cast 
votes and the expectation of fair and honest counting of votes cast.  See Frank J. Obara, Jr., 
The Counting and Reporting of the Vote, Including the Role of Inspectors of Elections, 10-3 in R. 
FRANKLIN BALOTTI, JESSE A. FINKELSTEIN & GREGORY P. WILLIAMS, MEETINGS OF 
STOCKHOLDERS (1995 & Supp. 2008) (commenting that in a fair and honest corporate 
election someone should attest to accuracy of the tabulation).  See also John H. Biggs, 
Shareholder Democracy:  The Roots of Activism and the Selection of Directors, 39 LOY. U. CHI. L.J.  
493, 501 (2008) (“The self-appointing character of how directors of public companies are 
elected has long been an awkward matter for boards to explain, in light of the perceived 
democratic process that shareholder ownership suggests.  The single slate of directors to 
‘choose’ from doesn’t square with American ideas of democracy.”). 
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must lie).  Fourth, it summarizes the practical realities of owning and 
trading shares in corporations, which is different today than it was when 
Delaware’s corporation law established key presumptions.  Fifth, it 
summarizes the procedures by which a corporation conducts an election 
and the attendant opportunities for errors.  And sixth, it touches on 
technologies that could simplify the process and reduce errors. 
A. Corporate Elections under Delaware’s General Corporation Law 
Delaware law affirms that directors hold the power to manage a 
Delaware corporation’s business, counterbalanced by shareholders’ 
power to elect the directors and to vote on the approval of fundamental 
proposals.26  Although, in theory, shareholders can nominate and elect 
directors and amend bylaws without prior board approval, as a practical 
matter they can only ratify or veto the board’s proposals.27  Theory and 
reality are often at odds; as one scholar has noted, “[c]ourts often 
commence their opinions with the stern but tired maxims of fiduciary 
duties . . . only to subsequently invoke the purifying balm of the 
‘business judgment rule’ . . . to preclude inquiry into the merits of 
directors’ decisions.”28 
                                                 
26 DEL. CODE tit. 8 § 141(a) (2009) (“The business and affairs of every corporation 
organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of 
directors.”); § 211(b) (2009) (annual meeting and election of directors); § 242 (2009) 
(amending the articles of incorporation); § 251(c) (2009) (shareholder approval of mergers); 
§ 271(a) (2009) (sale of substantially all corporate assets); § 275 (2009) (dissolution of 
corporation).  But cf. Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise 155 (Harvard 
Law School Discussion Paper No. 567, March 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=952078 (arguing that “[s]hareholders commonly do not have a viable power to 
replace the directors of public companies”); ADOLPH A. BERLE, JR., & GARDINER C. MEANS, 
THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 139 (1932) (describing the proxy 
machinery as not providing shareholders power over management but rather as separating 
power from shareholders).  In Speiser v. Baker, Chancellor Allen reviewed the history of the 
prohibition on directors voting corporately-held shares of stock, which dates from early 
nineteenth-century decisions.  525 A.2d 1001, 1009–10 (Del. Ch. 1987).  At all times since, 
courts have been concerned that directors should not control the means of perpetuating 
their power, and later corporation law statutes uniformly embodied the prohibition.  Id. 
27 DEL. CODE tit. 8 §§ 109(a), 211(b), 251(b)–(c), 271(a) (2009).  Compare Stephen M. 
Bainbridge, The Case for Limited Shareholder Voting Rights, 53 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 601, 616–17 
(2006) (“[O]nly the election of directors and amending the bylaws do not require board 
approval before shareholder action is possible.  In practice . . . even the election of 
directors . . . is predetermined by the existing board nominating the next year’s board.”), 
with Julian Velasco, Taking Shareholder Rights Seriously, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 605, 660 (2007) 
(finding it “deeply unsettling” that corporate elections allow shareholders only to vote for 
the candidate or abstain but not to vote against a candidate, and proposing that the SEC 
should amend proxy rules to allow “against” votes). 
28 Stuart R. Cohn, Demise of the Director’s Duty of Care:  Judicial Avoidance of Standards and 
Sanctions Through the Business Judgment Rule, 62 TEX. L. REV. 591, 593–94 (1983).  Compare In 
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By statute, strict rules apply to corporate elections.  Delaware 
corporations must call shareholder meetings annually, and may call 
special meetings according to circumstances that require a vote.29  The 
board must comply with statutory requirements in setting the record 
date, on which the list of shareholders eligible to vote is determined, and 
must make the list available to registered shareholders.30  In addition, the 
board must disclose information that is material to questions on which 
shareholders will vote.31  Registered record owners have the sole right to 
                                                                                                             
re Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc., 954 A.2d 346, 360–61 and n.48 (Del. Ch. 2008) (discussing 
Delaware courts’ consistent position that a breach of the board’s duty of disclosure 
surrounding matters on which shareholders vote leads to irreparable harm that justifies 
injunctive relief), and In re J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. S’holders Litig., 906 A.2d 766, 772 (Del. 
2006) (recognizing the stockholder’s right to cast an informed vote), and In re Topps Co. 
S’holders Litig., 926 A.2d 58, 94–95 (Del. Ch. 2007) (enjoining a merger vote where a 
standstill agreement with a competing bidder effectively withheld from shareholders 
material information concerning a proposed merger), and Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 
811 (Del. 1984) (if stockholders are displeased they have the power replace the board), and 
Guth v. Loft, 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939) (referring to a “rule that demands of a corporate 
officer or director, peremptorily and inexorably, the most scrupulous observance of his 
duty, not only affirmatively to protect the interests of the corporation committed to his 
charge, but also to refrain from doing anything that would work injury to the 
corporation”), with San Antonio Fire & Police Pension Fund v. Amylin Pharms., Inc., 2009 
WL 1337150 at *10 (Del. Ch. May 12, 2009) (upholding board’s power to enter into contracts 
that trigger a “poison put” debt acceleration if shareholders vote to replace directors, and 
exonerating the board from a duty of care to be informed of contractual commitments that 
conflict with the board’s fiduciary duties), and McPadden v. Sidhu, No. Civ. A. 3310-CC 
(Del. Ch. Aug. 29, 2008) (where directors countenanced egregious self-dealing by an officer 
in the spin-off of a subsidiary, the court found exculpable gross negligence rather than a 
breach of good faith or loyalty), and In re Bear Stearns Cos., Inc. S’holder Litig., 2008 WL 
959992 (Del. Ch. Apr. 9, 2008) (staying action in Delaware court with effect to allow 
issuance of new stock to acquirer to determine outcome of merger vote), and Moore Corp. 
Ltd. v. Wallace Computer Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1545, 1564 (D. Del. 1995) (directors had 
right to refuse to redeem the poison pill even though shareholders had tendered 73.4% of 
shares), and Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989) (approving 
Time board’s merger decision that gave shareholders a lower price than a competing offer 
and was structured to deny shareholders a vote, because of the threat that shareholders 
might perceive their interest differently than the board did).  In The Control and Conflict of 
Interest Voting Systems, Lynne L. Dallas argues that voting may co-opt shareholders, 
amounting to illusory participation that provides the mere appearance of accountability.  
71 N.C. L. REV. 1, 33–35 (1992). 
29 DEL. CODE tit. 8 § 211(b)–(d) (2009) (specifying requirements for meetings of 
shareholders; annual meetings; special meetings). 
30 Id. § 213 (2009) (fixing date for determination of stockholders of record); § 219 (2009) 
(list of stockholders entitled to vote; penalty for refusal to produce; stock ledger). 
31 SEC Rule 14A, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-13 (2007); Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 10 (Del. 
1998) (when communicating about corporate matters, “the sine qua non of directors’ 
fiduciary duty to shareholders is honesty”); Zirn v. VLI Corp., 681 A.2d 1050, 1056 (Del. 
1996) (directors’ duty to disclose includes avoiding partial disclosures that may mislead); 
Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 84 (Del. 1992) (when it seeks shareholder action, a board has a 
fiduciary duty to disclose fully and fairly all material information).  
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cast votes, although beneficial owners have the right to direct voting of 
their shares.32 
At a meeting of shareholders, the inspector of election has statutory 
duties:  to determine the number of shares eligible to vote and present at 
the meeting, either in person or by proxy; to receive proxies and ballots 
and to determine their validity (including hearing and resolving 
challenges); to count votes; and to provide a report certifying the vote 
totals as well as any challenges to voting rights.33  If the inspector of 
election cannot resolve a dispute as to the validity of proxies, the parties 
have recourse in the Chancery Court, which can order and supervise a 
new election or grant other equitable relief as appropriate.34 
The board of directors exercises significant control over the voting 
process.35  It nominates director candidates and sets the record date and 
meeting date; it has the exclusive right to formulate most proposals on 
which shareholders can vote; it appoints the proxy solicitors, tabulator, 
and inspector of election; and it controls the agenda and chairs the 
meeting.36  Unlike a competing faction, if any, the board can spend 
                                                 
32 DEL. CODE tit. 8 § 219(c) (2009); SEC Rule 14A-4, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-4 (2007).  See 
Berlin v. Emerald Partners, 552 A.2d 482, 494 (Del. 1989) (“from the perspective of the 
Delaware corporation, a broker who is the stockholder of record, has the legal authority to 
vote in person or by proxy on all matters.  Nevertheless, the relationship between a broker, 
who is the ‘record owner,’ and the beneficial owner is governed by the rules of the various 
stock exchanges.”); Enstar v. Senouf, 535 A.2d 1351, 1356 (Del. 1987) (a Delaware 
corporation need not look beyond the registered owners).  Commonly, the actual 
“beneficial” owner of shares is not the “record” owner shown on a corporation’s stock 
register; allowing a broker or bank to be the record owner facilitates trading and overall 
efficiency of stock markets.  See infra Part II.D.  Except on discretionary matters as defined 
by stock exchange rules, brokers are bound to vote according to beneficial owners’ voting 
instructions.  Berlin, 552 A.2d at 493–94 and nn.14–15 (citing stock exchange rules); Bay 
Nfld. Co., Ltd., v. Wilson & Co., Inc., 37 A.2d 59, 63 (Del. 1944) (registered holder would 
not be recognized in equity as entitled to vote shares against true owner’s wishes); Hauth 
v. Giant Portland Cement Co., 96 A.2d 233, 235 (Del.Ch. 1953) (proxyholder has fiduciary 
obligation to carry out owner’s wishes); In re Canal Const. Co., 182 A. 545, 548 (Del. Ch. 
1936) (estate administrator who transferred shares but was still registered holder on record 
date may not exercise the voting right in defiance of the transferee’s wishes). 
33 DEL. CODE tit. 8 § 231(b) (2009).  See also Obara, supra note 25, at 10-6. 
34 DEL. CODE tit. 8 §§ 225, 227 (2009); Berlin, 552 A.2d at 491 (inspectors’ determinations 
are presumed correct under law, but may be challenged in a suit). 
35 In re MONY Group S’holder Litig., 853 A.2d 661, 675 (Del. Ch. 2004) (“[I]n the context 
of a stockholder vote a board of directors must perform a myriad of ministerial functions in 
order to ensure an orderly voting process which all, in some way, indirectly affect the 
vote.”).  See also Dallas, supra note 28, at 19–20. 
36 DEL. CODE tit. 8 §§ 211(a), (d), 213, 231, 251(b)–(c), 271(a)–(b) (2009).  See, e.g., Portnoy 
v. Cryo-Cell Int’l, Inc., 940 A.2d 43 (Del. Ch. 2008) (setting aside a corporate election and 
holding that an incumbent board’s secret vote-buying arrangement and manipulative 
conduct of annual meeting were inequitable conduct); State of Wis. Inv. Bd. v. Peerless Sys. 
Corp., No. Civ. A.  17637, 2000 WL 1805376 at *12 (Del. Ch. Dec. 4, 2000) (declining 
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corporate funds to promote its candidates and proposals, and as the final 
vote count approaches, the board is better informed than any competing 
faction about how the vote is accumulating.37 
Delaware courts declare that boards have a duty of scrupulous 
fairness in conducting elections.38  Any time incumbent board members’ 
actions may be seen to promote board entrenchment, their good faith 
may be scrutinized.39  In Solomon v. Alexander, the court asked 
                                                                                                             
summary judgment against a board although it found none of the board’s “plethora” of 
justifications adequate for adjourning the meeting in order to selectively solicit additional 
proxies). 
37 Levin v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 264 F.Supp. 797, 803–04 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (in a 
contest over policy, a board may make reasonable corporate expenditures to persuade 
shareholders).  See infra text accompanying note 119; In re Topps Co. S’holders Litig., 926 
A.2d 58, 68 (Del. Ch. 2007) (documenting how the Topps CEO and chairman, facing defeat 
in a contested 2006 election of directors, postponed the annual meeting long enough to 
negotiate a deal with insurgents to enlarge the board—and save his directorship).  See also 
Yair Listokin, Management Always Wins the Close Ones, forthcoming in 10 AMER. L. & ECON. 
REV., available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm ?abstract_id=980695# at 29–30 
(“The status quo allows management to obtain frequent vote updates, while shareholder 
opponents of management often have no comparable knowledge. . . . [I]f management sees 
that it is well behind, it can undertake an extraordinary effort, while its opponents have no 
obvious way of responding.”). 
 In Portnoy, the Chancery Court found a board’s exploitation of such advantage 
inequitable; since that decision, a new innovation, designed to assure that management will 
prevail, has appeared in proxy solicitations.  940 A.2d at 47.  An example is found in the 
voting instruction form distributed on behalf of Foundry Networks, Inc. for its special 
meeting to be held on Dec. 17, 2008:  the board asked shareholders to approve Proposal 2—
“To approve the adjournment of the special meeting to permit further solicitation of 
proxies if there are not sufficient votes at the special meeting to approve the first proposal 
[a Plan of Merger] described above”—that is, management solicited an exculpating 
ratification, in advance, of conduct the courts have found improper.  Foundry Networks, 
Inc. Special Meeting to be Held on 12/17/08 at 10:00 a.m. PST for Holders as of 11/07/08 
(voting instruction form distributed by or on behalf of UBS Financial Services, Inc. to 
beneficial owners) (on file with author). 
38 Aprahamian v. HBO & Co., 531 A.2d 1204 (Del. Ch. 1987).  The court was emphatic: 
The corporate election process, if it is to have any validity, must be 
conducted with scrupulous fairness and without any advantage being 
conferred or denied to any candidate or slate of candidates . . . those in 
charge of the election machinery of a corporation must be held to the 
highest standards in providing for and conducting corporate elections. 
Id. at 1206–07; see also Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 10 (Del. 1998) (stating that directors’ 
fiduciary duties of due care, good faith, and loyalty are unremitting and include duty to 
deal with shareholders honestly). 
39 Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 437, 439 (Del. 1971) (holding the board 
acted inequitably, with purpose to perpetuate itself in office, when it advanced the annual 
meeting date and thereby denied a dissident faction time to mount its proxy battle); accord 
Lerman v. Diagnostic Data, Inc., 421 A.2d 906, 914 (Del. Ch. 1980) (invalidating board 
action when, faced with a known dissident, the board had called an annual meeting with 
only sixty-three days advance notice after passing a bylaw requiring alternative director 
candidates be nominated seventy days in advance of the annual meeting); Giuricich v. 
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rhetorically, “how should a court . . . conceive of the best way to protect 
shareholders’ valid expectation that they will be dealt with fairly?” and 
answered, “a fully-informed, non-coerced vote.”40  Courts have found 
wrongful coercion where someone’s actions cause shareholders to vote 
for a reason other than the merits of the transaction.41  A board’s duty is 
not only to abstain from overtly and intentionally manipulating 
corporate elections, but also to be affirmatively fair to dissidents; a board 
may not passively take advantage of a bylaw that prevents dissident 
shareholders from conducting a timely proxy contest.42  However, 
                                                                                                             
Emtrol Corp., 449 A.2d 232, 239 (Del. 1982) (willful perpetuation of a shareholder deadlock, 
resulting in board’s entrenchment, frustrated a 50% shareholder’s voting rights and 
justified court’s appointment of a custodian).  On entrenchment in takeover battles, see 
infra Part II.C.4. 
40 Solomon v. Alexander, 747 A.2d 1098, 1127 (Del. Ch. 1999).  The case involved a 
shareholder challenge to the division of assets and disentanglement of information 
technology operations when General Motors split off its Electronic Data Systems (EDS) 
subsidiary to holders of a “tracking stock” based on EDS’s operating performance.  Id. at 
1106–09.  Although plaintiffs’ allegations might have rebutted the presumption of 
protection by the business judgment rule, the court found that an uncoerced vote of 
shareholders preserved the protection.  Id. at 1111. 
41 Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368, 1382–83 (Del. 1996) (vote by a majority of 
shareholders validly ratified a board-passed recapitalization involving an amendment to 
the certificate of incorporation that diminished the voting power of shares for three years 
after their sale to a new shareholder).  A court may nullify an election if it finds coercion in 
proxy disclosures or in the terms of a proposed transaction or in surrounding 
circumstances.  Id. at 1382. 
42 See Moran v. Household Intern., Inc., 490 A.2d 1059, 1080 (Del. Ch. 1985) (subversion 
of corporate democracy  by manipulation of corporate machinery will not be countenanced 
under Delaware law).  But cf. Hubbard v. Hollywood Park Realty Enters.,  No. Civ. A. 
11779, 1991 WL 3151 (Del. Ch. Jan. 14, 1991).  In Hubbard, the board had enforced an 
advance-notice bylaw even though circumstances changed materially after the advance-
notice deadline had passed, to the disadvantage of dissidents who wished to nominate 
alternative candidates.  Id. at *2.  The court required the board to waive the bylaw and 
allow dissident shareholders to nominate a slate of director candidates, reasoning that 
“occasions do arise where board inaction, even where not inequitable in purpose or design, 
may nonetheless operate inequitably.”  Id. at *10.  In Blasius, Chancellor Allen noted that 
“an unintended breach of the duty of loyalty is unusual but not novel.”  564 A.2d at 663 
(citing Lerman and AC Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103 
(Del.Ch. 1986)).  In Linton v. Everett, Vice Chancellor Jacobs set aside election results, noting 
“it is not required that scienter, i.e., actual subjective intent to impede the voting process, be 
shown.” No. Civ. A. 15219, 1997 WL 441189, at *9 (Del. Ch. July 31, 1997); accord Accipiter 
Life Sciences Fund, L.P. v. Helfer, 905 A.2d 115, 127 (Del. Ch. 2006) (holding that the court’s 
“equitable powers can only be roused under Schnell where compelling circumstances . . . 
constitute an evident or grave incursion into the fabric of the corporate law”).  Cf. In re Walt 
Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 757 (Del. Ch. 2005) (discussing the possibility of 
breaching fiduciary duty through inaction).  But in In re Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc., 
Chancellor Chandler stated that “a vote tabulation claim that fails to allege any 
wrongdoing . . . on the part of the individual defendants can only be asserted against the 
Company” and that a plaintiff asking a court to invalidate an election must present clear 
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despite frequent references in dicta to a board’s fiduciary duties, the 
courts seldom, even in cases of wrongdoing, apply a remedy other than 
merely setting aside an unfair election and ordering a new one.43   
B. Contested Elections 
For many years, shareholders’ role in public companies was mostly 
passive.44  But recently, activist investors, including pension plans and 
hedge funds, as well as so-called raiders like Carl Icahn, have contested 
director elections, compensation proposals, charter and bylaw 
amendments, merger and takeover transactions, and precatory 
                                                                                                             
and convincing evidence that the election was in fact invalid.  954 A.2d 346, 374 nn.124–25 
(Del. Ch. 2008). 
43 See, e.g., cases cited supra notes 36–42.  But cf. Rice & Hutchins, Inc. v. Triplex Shoe Co., 
147 A. 317, 324 (Del. Ch. 1929) (reversing outcome of contested election of directors by 
court order).  In striking contrast, tampering with union elections can result in criminal 
racketeering charges.  In United States v. DeFries, union officials were charged with 
fraudulently procuring their election as well as approval by members of a merger with 
another union that triggered generous severance payments to the officials, who 
immediately assumed the same responsibilities for the successor merged union.  858 F. 
Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1994), order rev’d on other grounds, 43 F.3d 707 (D.C. Cir. 1995), and on 
remand, 909 F. Supp. 13 (D.D.C. 1995), rev’d on other grounds, 129 F.3d 1293 (D.C. Cir. 1997).  
The trial court noted that: 
[18 U.S.C.] § 1346 has expressly declared “honest services” to be an 
interest protected by the mail fraud statute, and it appears to the Court 
that the “honest services” any organization is entitled to expect of its 
officers includes, at a minimum, that the officers. . . refrain from 
corrupting the organization’s election proceedings . . . .  
858 F. Supp at 4.  In reinstating mail fraud counts of the indictment, the appeal court stated 
that the improperly handled ballots were property covered by the mail fraud statute and 
that 
even if it were actually proven at trial that the defendants tampered 
with fewer ballots than necessary to turn the election, the theft would 
nevertheless undermine the election’s credibility—and thus the value 
of the union’s entire investment in the process—if accompanied by 
evidence of a risk of broader wrongdoing. 
43 F.3d at 710.  A jury convicted the defendants of mail fraud and racketeering, 909 F. 
Supp. at 15, but procedural error and faulty jury instructions caused reversal on appeal.  
129 F.3d at 1302, 1305, 1310, 1312. 
44 Blasius, 564 A.2d at 659 (Del. Ch. 1985) (“[i]t has, for a long time, been conventional to 
dismiss the stockholder vote as a vestige or ritual of little practical importance. It may be 
that we are now witnessing the emergence of new institutional voices and arrangements 
that will make the stockholder vote a less predictable affair than it has been.”).  See also 
Iman Anabtawi & Lynn Stout, Fiduciary Duties for Activist Shareholders 4–5, UCLA School of 
Law, Law & Economics Research Paper No. 08-02, available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=1089606. 
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resolutions.45  As a result, today shareholders’ votes make a difference 
more than ever before.46 
In response to hostile corporate takeover battles that emerged during 
the 1980s, corporations adopted a variety of defenses, such as the 
stockholder rights plan, commonly known as the poison pill.47  After 
Delaware courts legitimated the poison pill, it became a favored 
mechanism for boards to fend off unsolicited takeover bids.48  A board 
                                                 
45 NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 312.01 Shareholder 
Approval, available at http://www.nyse.com/Frameset.html?nyseref=http%3A//www. 
nyse.com/regulation/listed/1182508124422.html&displayPage=/lcm/lcm_section.html.  
The NYSE manual notes:  “Shareholders’ interest and participation in corporate affairs has 
greatly increased. Management has responded by providing more extensive and frequent 
reports on matters of interest to investors. In addition, an increasing number of important 
corporate decisions are being referred to shareholders for their approval.”  See State of Wis. 
Inv. Bd., No. Civ. A. 17637, 2000 WL 1805376, at *19 (Del. Ch. Dec. 4, 2000) (“[s]ince the 
Blasius opinion was issued over a decade ago, several large institutional stockholders, 
including SWIB, have become increasingly proactive in challenging management proposals 
by asserting their rights as stockholders.”); Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, The Hanging 
Chads of Corporate Voting, 96 GEO. L.J. 1227, 1229 (2008) (citing three mergers in recent years 
that were approved by slim margins:  Compaq and Hewlett-Packard with 51.4% approval, 
AXA and MONY with 53.8% approval, and Transkaryotic Therapies with 52% approval); 
Listokin, supra note 37, at 14 (identifying over 16,000 resolutions presented for shareholder 
approval during the period from 1997 to 2004).  See also Biggs, supra note 25 (arguing that 
shareholder activism results in large measure from the shift from defined-benefit to 
defined-contribution retirement plans prompted by the 1976 enactment of ERISA and 
resultant democratization of interest in corporate governance). 
46 Soc’y of Corp. Sec’ys & Governance Prof’ls, Comment Letter to the SEC Re:  
Roundtables Regarding Stockholder Rights and the Federal Proxy Rules, Proxy Voting 
Issues:  Voting Integrity, Mar. 26, 2007, at 2, http://www.governanceprofessionals.org/ 
commentletters/flash20s.shtml (“[w]ith closer elections and increasing shareholder 
activism, it is important that votes are counted accurately and fairly represent the long-
term interests of all stockholders.”). 
47 Lucian A. Bebchuk, John C. Coates IV & Guhan Subramanian, The Powerful 
Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 54 STANFORD L. REV. 887, 
904 (2002). 
Poison pills consist of stock warrants or rights that allow the holder to 
buy an acquirer’s stock (a so-called  “flip over” provision), the target’s 
stock (a “flip in” provision), or both at a substantial discount from the 
market price. These rights only become exercisable in the event that a 
shareholder (the “acquiring person”) buys more than a certain 
percentage of the target’s stock (typically 10 or 15%) without the target 
board’s approval.  These rights are explicitly not exercisable by the 
acquiring person, so the resulting dilution in his voting power and 
economic stake may make the acquisition of the target through market 
purchases too expensive to pursue. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
48 Moran, 500 A.2d 1346, 1352 (holding that a “poison pill” defense is legal under 
Delaware law).  See Kahan & Rock, supra note 45, at 1229 (“In takeover contests, Delaware 
law, by upholding the poison pill, has channeled the decision into the annual meeting.  The 
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equipped with a poison pill could force the bidder to negotiate with the 
board rather than offer to purchase shares from shareholders.49  The only 
way for a bidder to overcome a poison pill is to oust the board, replacing 
it with a new board that will remove the pill; so, with the widespread 
adoption of poison pills, takeover bids were channeled into proxy 
contests for control of corporate boards.50 
C. Fiduciary Duties—Standards of Review 
A keystone of corporate law is the separation of ownership and 
control of the modern corporation:  managers manage,51 but 
shareholders have rights to elect directors, to approve “fundamental” 
changes (usually only proposals made by the board of directors), and to 
sell their shares.52  Deriving from the history of the corporate form, 
fiduciary rules of agency law underlie the relationship between owners 
(shareholders) and managers (directors and officers) of a corporation.53  
                                                                                                             
prevailing mode of hostile acquisitions has become a bid coupled with a proxy contest so 
as to replace the directors and remove the poison pill.”). 
49 R. Franklin Balotti & J. Travis Laster, Professor Coates is Right. Now Please Study 
Stockholder Voting. 54 U. MIAMI L. REV. 819, 819 (2000). 
50 See Allen et al., supra note 15, at 1313 (“Replacing the board became an essential part 
of a hostile offeror’s strategy, because that was the only way to circumvent the otherwise 
preclusive effect of the poison pill”).  But cf. Velasco, supra note 27, at 675 (arguing that 
takeover bids are not about managing the business—directors’ domain—but about 
shareholder’s rights to sell their shares, a decision in which directors should not intrude). 
51 DEL. CODE tit. 8 § 141(a) (2009).  The code states the principle: 
The business and affairs of every corporation organized under this 
chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of 
directors, except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter or in its 
certificate of incorporation. If any such provision is made in the 
certificate of incorporation, the powers and duties conferred or 
imposed upon the board of directors by this chapter shall be exercised 
or performed to such extent and by such person or persons as shall be 
provided in the certificate of incorporation. 
Id. 
52 See supra notes 26–27 (listing statutes that set out shareholders’ rights relating to 
fundamental changes). 
53 Dallas, supra note 28, at 5–12 (outlining the history of corporate law as it pertains to 
voting rights, from origins in partnership and contract to the entity theory to modern 
concepts involving the interaction of multiple constituencies).  Dallas concludes the 
historical discussion with the observation that management is no longer an agent of 
shareholders.  Id. at 11.   Bainbridge describes the function of shareholder voting rights as a 
means of holding empowered directors accountable to tacit bargains, or at least to 
standards of reasonable performance, but also as “an accountability device of last resort to 
be used sparingly . . . .”  Bainbridge, supra note 27, at 627.  However, in Bainbridge’s view 
the board operates “within a pervasive web of accountability mechanisms that substitute 
for monitoring” by shareholders and shareholder voting is therefore all but superfluous.  
Id. at 625.   
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Even though many decisions have narrowed the duties that directors 
owe to shareholders, Delaware courts maintain that directors of a 
corporation are in a fiduciary relation to the corporation and its 
shareholders, and that the fiduciary relation is relevant to the conduct of 
corporate elections.54  
Delaware decisions of the 1985–1995 takeover era shaped modern 
corporate law regarding the rights and duties of shareholders and 
directors.55  Ex-Chancellor Allen, writing in 2001 with Vice Chancellors 
Jacobs and Strine, recounted the story of how: 
                                                 
54 Loft, Inc. v. Guth, 2 A.2d 225, 238 (Del. Ch. 1938).  The Chancery Court reaffirmed this 
principle in Solomon: 
The nature and effect of the fiduciary relationship between directors 
and shareholders is the very bedrock of Delaware’s corporate 
jurisprudence. A basic duty of fairness, i.e., the requirement to treat 
shareholders and their equity interest in the corporation fairly, is the 
broadest notion of the duties directors owe to the corporation’s 
shareholders. 
747 A.2d at 1111.  But cf. Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 256 (Del.2000) (“Aspirational ideals 
of good corporate governance practices . . . are highly desirable, [and] often tend to benefit 
stockholders . . . .  But they are not required by the corporation law and do not define 
standards of liability.”).  A number of academic commentators argue that modern practice 
has, in effect, superseded the courts’ stated adherence to fiduciary duties.  See Douglas G. 
Baird & M. Todd Henderson, Other People’s Money (Fiduciary Duty to Shareholders), 60 
STANFORD L. REV. 1309, 1317–20 (2008) (noting common board actions that violate the 
presumption of fiduciary duty to shareholders without objection from courts, such as filing 
bankruptcy, triangular mergers, mergers into a shell company that eliminate a class of 
stock, structuring a merger as an asset sale to eliminate shareholders’ appraisal rights, and 
declaring in-kind dividends without regard to tax consequences to shareholders); Daniel J. 
H. Greenwood, Fictional Shareholders: For Whom are Corporate Managers Trustees, Revisited, 69 
S. CAL. L. REV. 1021, 1038–45 (199–6) (arguing that the shareholders whom directors 
represent are a fictional abstraction without the legal rights real principals have over real 
agents, being powerless, e.g., to initiate actions, bind directors as agents, or terminate 
directors as agents); Ethan G. Stone, Business Strategists and Election Commissioners: How the 
Meaning of Loyalty Varies with the Board’s Distinct Fiduciary Roles, 31 J. CORP. L. 893, 922, 930 
n.164 (2006) (describing the relationship between shareholders and directors as more 
accurately resembling beneficiary/trustee than principal/agent). 
55 Allen et al., supra note 15, at 1293.  Written by three of the principal participants, this 
paper recounts how standards of review evolved in adjudication of particular cases. The 
key decisions that reshaped Delaware corporate law, discussed infra, were:  Smith v. Van 
Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 880 (Del. 1985) (establishing a so-called gross negligence standard of 
review for directors’ duty of care—soon effectively removed by 65 Del. Laws ch. 28g, §§ 1–
2 (1986) (current version 8 DEL. CODE tit.8  § 102(b)(7) (2009)), which allowed corporations 
to insulate directors from liability for damages); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 
A.2d 946, 957–58 (Del. 1985) (holding that in takeover cases directors must be reasonable in 
both perceiving a threat to the corporation and in crafting a defensive response—an 
intermediate standard); Moran v. Household Int’l., Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1352 (Del. 1985) 
(holding that “poison pill” defense is legal under Delaware law); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews 
& Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 181 (Del. 1986) (holding that once a transfer of control 
is inevitable, directors’ duty is to obtain the best possible sale price for shareholders—a 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 44, No. 1 [2009], Art. 5
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol44/iss1/5
2009] Elephant in the Boardroom? 139 
[r]equired to develop a body of rules to impose legal 
order upon . . . (a dynamic revolution in corporate 
merger activity) . . . , the Delaware courts employed the 
fiduciary duty doctrine to evaluate the decisions of 
corporate directors in a multitude of circumstances . . . .  
The end result was the articulation by Delaware courts 
of new standards of review in cases such as Unocal, 
Revlon, and Blasius . . . .”56 
Before considering how fiduciary duties apply to corporate elections, 
the following sections briefly review the key decisions that shaped the 
law of fiduciary duties between corporate directors and shareholders:  
the duties of care and loyalty, special duties in the context of selling a 
company or defending against a hostile takeover bid, the duty of good 
faith, the duty of disclosure, and how context conditions the 
interpretation of fiduciary duties. 
1. Duty of Care 
Duty-of-care claims charge that directors acted without taking 
sufficient care to ensure that their decisions were good for the 
corporation; such claims are essentially about negligence.57  Not wanting 
to deter risk-taking, Delaware courts long avoided finding liability so 
long as directors acted in subjective good faith, and set a lenient gross-
                                                                                                             
different intermediate standard); Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 668 (Del. 
Ch. 1988) (holding that board action taken to thwart the shareholder vote will not be 
upheld absent a compelling justification); Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 
1140, 1153–54 (Del. 1990) (holding that under the Unocal standard the board may 
reasonably defend against substantive coercion, i.e., the threat that shareholders will 
disbelieve the board’s reasons for opposing an unsolicited bid); Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 
78 (Del. 1992) (holding that Unocal analysis applies to any defensive measure involving 
issues of control, even if it implicates voting rights); Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 
345, 361 (Del. 1993) (holding that rebuttal of business judgment rule will subject directors to 
entire fairness review, i.e., the duty-of-loyalty standard); Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. QVC 
Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 47 (Del. 1994) (holding that either a change-of-control transaction 
or defensive measures may trigger enhanced scrutiny, which includes judicial review of 
board’s decision-making and actions); and Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 
1372–73 (Del. 1995) (holding that board’s action under Unocal analysis must be 
proportionate, neither precluding nor coercing shareholders’ exercise of voting rights). 
56 Allen et al., supra note 15, at 1294.  
57 Id. at 1299-1300 (“[T]he Delaware supreme court, although purporting to apply the 
gross negligence standard of review, in reality applied an ordinary negligence 
standard . . . . [It] withdrew much of the comfort and greater incentive for risk-taking 
promised by that more lenient standard.”) 
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negligence standard for the duty of care.58  However, the standard soon 
was interpreted more strictly in Smith v. Van Gorkom, in which the court 
found a board liable for damages because it did not investigate and 
deliberate sufficiently, even though the buyout offer it approved realized 
a 40% control premium for shareholders.59  The Delaware legislature 
promptly provided for elimination of directors’ duty-of-care liability.60  
Delaware statutes also afford broad protection to directors when they 
rely on reports or advice from persons with professional expertise.61  As 
in Van Gorkom, later duty-of-care cases focus on the sufficiency of a 
board’s decision-making process.62 
2. Duty of Loyalty 
In claimed breaches of the duty of loyalty, involving self-dealing, 
usurpation of a corporate opportunity, or other conflicts of interest, 
directors must satisfy a stringent “intrinsic fairness” standard.63  If 
                                                 
58 Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984); see also Allen et al., supra note 15, at 
1299 (gross negligence is “a standard facially far more lenient than the simple ‘negligence’ 
standard of conduct.”). 
59 488 A.2d at 880 (Del. 1985) (holding directors liable for deciding to accept buyout offer 
after insufficient diligence in reviewing the offer and alternatives). 
60 The new provision enacted in 1986 enables a Delaware corporation to amend its 
certificate of incorporation to include “[a] provision eliminating or limiting the personal 
liability of a director to the corporation or its stockholders for monetary damages for 
breach of fiduciary duty” in duty-of-care cases but not for breach of the duty of loyalty, 
bad-faith actions, or self-dealing transactions.  65 Del. Laws ch. 28g, §§ 1–2 (1986), codified 
as DEL. STAT. tit. 8 § 102(b)(7) (2009).  Exculpatory provisions have since become nearly 
universal in Delaware corporations’ articles of incorporation.  See In re Walt Disney Co. 
Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 65 (Del. 2006) (“Section 102(b)(7) of the DGCL . . . authorizes 
Delaware corporations, by a provision in the certificate of incorporation, to exculpate their 
directors from monetary damage liability for a breach of the duty of care.”). 
61 DEL. CODE tit. 8 § 141(e) (2009) provides:  
[a] member of the board of directors . . . shall . . . be fully protected in 
relying in good faith upon the records of the corporation and upon 
such information, opinions, reports or statements presented to the 
corporation by any of the corporation’s officers or employees, or 
committees of the board of directors, or by any other person as to 
matters the member reasonably believes are within such other person’s 
professional or expert competence and who has been selected with 
reasonable care by or on behalf of the corporation. 
62  E.g., Brehm, 746 A.2d at 264 (“Due care in the decision[-]making context is process due 
care only.”).  Shareholders alleged breach of fiduciary duty after The Walt Disney 
Company’s board of directors approved a $140 million severance package for a dismissed 
former president; the court held that the board had relied in good faith on expert advice 
concerning the former president’s employment agreement.  Id. at 248, 261. 
63 Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971) (self-dealing, through a 
parent corporation’s domination of a subsidiary, breaches the duty of loyalty to minority 
shareholders).  In In re eBay S’holders Litig., 2004 WL 253521 (Del. Ch. Feb. 11, 2004), the 
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directors’ financial interests diverge from shareholders’ interests, the 
protections of the business judgment rule and exculpatory provisions do 
not apply; in such cases, directors must show that both the process and 
the price in a financial transaction were fair to the corporation and 
shareholders, or obtain ratification of the challenged transaction by 
shareholders or disinterested directors.64 
When corporate takeover battles produced cases that fell between 
the straightforward duty-of-care and duty-of-loyalty standards, the 
Delaware courts developed intermediate standards of review to deal 
with them; over time, two intermediate standards came to control most 
decisions, depending on whether the issue was sale of the company or 
control of the board.65 
3. Best Price in Sale of Company 
Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. established a 
standard of review that applies when the sale of a company or 
substantially all of its assets is in process.66  Reasoning that changed 
circumstances alter a board’s fiduciary responsibilities, the Delaware 
Supreme Court held that once the Revlon board understood that sale of 
the corporation was inevitable, the directors’ duty to shareholders 
“changed from defenders of the corporate bastion to auctioneers charged 
with getting the best price for the stockholders at a sale of the 
company.”67  Post-Revlon, if sale of the company becomes inevitable, the 
board no longer enjoys managerial discretion in decision-making—its 
duty is to seek the best price for shareholders.68 
                                                                                                             
court refused to dismiss a suit claiming defendant directors of eBay usurped a corporate 
opportunity.  Id. at 5.  As “thanks” for directing eBay business to them, investment bankers 
had allocated to the individual directors dozens of IPO positions that afforded them many 
millions of dollars of quick profits; the court found grounds, sufficient to withstand a 
dismissal motion, that this gratuity was improperly diverted from the corporation, 
constituting a breach of the directors’ duty of loyalty.  Id. at 1. 
64 Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85, 92 (Del. 2001) (“unless there is a violation of 
the duty of loyalty or the duty of good faith, a trial on the issue of entire fairness is 
unnecessary because a Section 102(b)(7) provision will exculpate director defendants from 
paying monetary damages that are exclusively attributable to a violation of the duty of 
care.”)  Accord Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710–11 (Del. 1983) (“[W]here one 
stands on both sides of a transaction, he has the burden of establishing its entire fairness, 
sufficient to pass the test of careful scrutiny by the courts . . . .  The concept of fairness has 
two basic aspects:  fair dealing and fair price.”). 
65 Allen et al., supra note 15, at 1312. 
66 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986). 
67 Id. at 182.  The Revlon board approved a merger and then enacted “lock-up” 
defensive measures against other bidders.  Id. at 176–79. 
68 Id. at 182.  The court held that, having decided on a transfer of control, directors were 
bound to seek the best price for shareholders and could not play favorites among 
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4. Anti-Takeover Defenses 
The decision in Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co. determined a 
standard for reviewing a board’s defensive actions in a contest for 
control:  when a board adopts anti-takeover measures, it must show both 
that it reasonably perceived the bid as a threat to corporate effectiveness 
and policy, and that the defensive measures were a reasonable response 
to the threat.69  Ten years later, in Unitrin, Inc. v. American General Corp., 
the court further clarified the reasonableness of defensive measures:  “if 
the board of directors’ defensive response is not draconian (preclusive or 
coercive) and is within a ‘range of reasonableness,’ a court must not 
substitute its judgment for the board’s.”70 
In Blasius Industries, Inc. v. Atlas Corp., the court directly addressed 
how shareholders’ voting franchise relates to the board’s legitimacy.71  
The Blasius test requires that if the plaintiff can show the board acted 
with the primary purpose to thwart shareholders’ voting rights, then the 
board must show a compelling justification for its action, even if it acted 
                                                                                                             
competing bidders.  Id. at 184.  In further clarifying Revlon duties, the courts have held that 
directors may seek the best price by a variety of methods, including single-bidder 
negotiations supplemented by an effective market check as an alternative to conducting an 
auction.  Allen et al., supra note 15, at 1321. 
69 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985).  As part of its rationale, the Unocal court noted the 
inherent danger when a threat to control is involved; directors are necessarily confronted 
with a conflict of interest, making an objective decision difficult.  Id., quoting Bennett v. 
Propp, 187 A.2d 405, 409 (1962).  But cf. Solomon, 747 A.2d at 1126 (“In most circumstances 
Delaware law . . . rejects the notion that a director’s interest in maintaining his office, by 
itself, is a debilitating factor.”). 
70 651 A.2d 1361, 1388 (Del. 1995), quoting Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. QVC Network, 
Inc., 637 A.2d at 45–46.  In its reasoning about proportionate responses, the court also 
discussed its decision applying Unocal in Moran v. Household Int’l., Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 
1357 (Del. 1985), in which the board’s response was proportionate because it did not “strip” 
the stockholders of their right to receive tender offers and did not fundamentally restrict 
proxy contests.  Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1387.  In Williams v. Geier, the court stated that 
wrongful coercion may exist where a party takes actions that cause shareholders to vote for 
some reason other than the merits of the transaction.  671 A.2d 1368, 1382–83 (Del. 1996). 
71 564 A.2d 651, 669 (Del. Ch. 1988) (invalidating a board’s actions to increase its size 
with friendly new directors when incumbent directors admitted they had acted to thwart 
the election of a new board majority and the board lacked a compelling justification).  Even 
though directors, facing a shareholder consent proposal to reconstitute the board, had 
acted on their view of the corporation’s best interest, their action was “an offense to the 
relationship between corporate directors and shareholders . . . .”  Id. at 652.  Because of the 
intended effect on an impending vote of shareholders, Chancellor Allen saw the board’s 
action not as exercising the corporation’s power, rights or obligations, but as involving the 
legal and equitable obligations of an agent to a principal—a question that may not be left to 
the agent’s sole business judgment.  Id. at 660.  Even if the board knew better than 
shareholders what was best for the company, only the shareholders have the right to 
determine who should be on the board, and therefore the board’s action was a violation of 
its duty of loyalty to shareholders.  Id. at 663. 
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in good faith.72  The courts have applied Blasius in cases that involve a 
board’s overt manipulation of the voting process, for example, in setting 
the date of a shareholders’ meeting, by enacting onerous notice 
requirements for shareholder-initiated proxy proposals, by limiting 
access to the list of registered shareholders, or by abuse of the power to 
chair the shareholders’ meeting.73 
In Stroud v. Grace and further in Unitrin, the Delaware Supreme 
Court subsumed the Blasius standard within the second step of the 
Unocal analysis (reasonableness of defensive measures), applicable when 
the issue of control is present.74  As a result, in the evolved Unocal-
                                                 
72 Id. at 662–63.  The decision drew on precedents where the board acted to tamper with 
the election process; see Schnell v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc., 285 A.2d 437, 437 (Del. 1971) 
(board advanced date of annual meeting to handicap dissident shareholders’ proxy efforts); 
Aprahamian v. HBO & Co., 531 A.2d 1204, 1206 (Del. Ch. 1987) (board postponed annual 
meeting to disadvantage insurgent proxy holders).  The Blasius decision added the 
“compelling justification” burden, to clarify that invalidation of board action was not a per 
se rule.  Blasius, 564 A.2d at 662. 
73 Compare Chesapeake Corp. v. Shore, 771 A.2d 293, 296–97 (Del.Ch. 2000) (board 
unilaterally enacted a by-law requiring a super-majority to overcome an anti-takeover 
defense), and State of Wis. Inv. Bd. v. Peerless Sys. Corp., No. Civ. A. 17637, 2000 WL 
1805376 at *3 (Del. Ch. Dec. 4, 2000) (despite having a quorum, board adjourned meeting to 
selectively solicit additional proxies favoring its proposal, which otherwise would have 
lost), and MM Cos. v. Liquid Audio, Inc., 813 A.2d 1118, 1121 (Del. 2003) (board increased 
its size to dilute voting power of directors elected by insurgent shareholders), and Portnoy 
v. Cryo-Cell Int’l, Inc., 940 A.2d 43, 46–47 (Del. Ch. 2008) (where a threatened incumbent 
board had coordinated vote-buying and manipulated conduct of annual meeting, court 
ordered new election), with Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 91–92 (Del. 1992) (board’s control 
was not threatened and 78 percent of shareholders approved a board proposal to amend 
bylaws; the Delaware Supreme Court held that the Blasius test did not apply), and Stahl v. 
Apple Bancorp, Inc., 579 A.2d 1115, 1117–18 (Del. Ch. 1990) (in response to a tender offer, a 
board delayed a meeting that had been contemplated but was not required; the court found 
no disenfranchisement that would invoke the Blasius test).  Delaware courts appear less 
likely to apply Blasius in cases involving a board decision about a business transaction than 
when the dispute is purely a matter of board power.  See David C. McBride & Danielle 
Gibbs, Voting Rights: The Metaphysics of Blasius Industries v. Atlas Corp., 26 DEL. J. CORP. L. 
927, 936 (2001) (reviewing consistency and usefulness of the Blasius doctrine); Velasco, 
supra note 27 at 657–59 (2007) (proposing expanding the application of Blasius whenever 
there is intent to interfere with shareholders’ voting rights, not only where a plaintiff can 
prove interference was the primary purpose, arguing that corporation law specifically 
allocates voting rights to shareholders as a balance against broad powers allocated to 
boards of directors and any interference should therefore be subject to close scrutiny). 
74 Stroud, 606 A.2d at 92 n.3 (court must apply Unocal where the board adopts a 
defensive measure that touches on issues of control); Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1379 (under 
Unocal, enhanced scrutiny of defensive measures means they must not preclude or coerce 
shareholder choices and must be in a range of reasonableness); accord MM Cos., 813 A.2d at 
1130 (court must protect shareholders’ franchise within Unocal’s requirement that defensive 
measures be proportionate and reasonable in relation to the threat); see also Allen et al., 
supra note 15, at 1316 (Delaware courts gradually “folded” the Blasius standard into 
Unocal). 
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Unitrin-Blasius standard, a court first determines whether the board’s 
perception of a threat to the corporation and its response to the threat are 
reasonable; if so, it applies the business judgment rule.  If not, and if the 
board’s defensive response directly involves shareholders’ voting rights, 
the Unitrin analysis (whether a defensive measure coerces or precludes 
effective voting by shareholders) examines also the Blasius question of 
the board’s subjective intent in adopting the defensive measure.75 
5. Duty of Good Faith 
In contrast to the better understood duties of care and loyalty, the 
legal meaning of the duty of good faith was foggy until 2005, when 
Chancellor Chandler gave it definition in In re Walt Disney Company 
Derivative Litigation, stating that “intentional dereliction of duty, a 
conscious disregard for one’s responsibilities” is a valid (but not the 
exclusive) standard for determining good faith.76  Breach of the duty of 
                                                 
75 Allen et al., supra note 15, at 1312–16 (discussing how, once poison pills made 
replacement of the board essential to corporate takeover strategies, considerations of equity 
led the courts to evolve the Blasius doctrine to look much like the Unocal/Unitrin standard).  
Allen et al. opine that Unocal/Unitrin analysis is adequate so long as judges keep a “gimlet 
eye out for inequitably motivated electoral manipulations” and recommend that the 
Supreme Court should formally unify the Unocal/Unitrin and Blasius doctrines.  Id. at 1316.  
See Mercier v. Inter-Tel, 929 A.2d 786 (Del. Ch. 2007) (discussing the evolved 
reasonableness standard and—uniquely—finding that a board had satisfied the Blasius 
“compelling justification” standard). 
76 907 A.2d 693, 754–55 (Del. Ch. 2005), aff’d 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006).  Acknowledging 
that the duty of good faith is “[s]hrouded in the fog of . . . hazy jurisprudence,” Chancellor 
Chandler stated that:  
[u]pon long and careful consideration, I am of the opinion 
that . . . intentional dereliction of duty, a conscious disregard for one's 
responsibilities, is an appropriate (although not the only) standard for 
determining whether fiduciaries have acted in good faith.  Deliberate 
indifference and inaction in the face of a duty to act is, in my mind, 
conduct that is clearly disloyal to the corporation. 
Id.; accord Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 369, 372 (Del. 2006) (holding that test of oversight 
liability, sustained or systematic failure of board to exercise oversight, relies on the duty of 
good faith, as instance of failure to act in the face of a known duty to act).  See generally 
Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Duty of Good Faith in Corporate Law, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1 (2006).  In  
Eisenberg’s formulation, the elements of the duty of good faith are subjective honesty or 
sincerity, conformity to generally accepted corporate norms and standards of business 
decency, and fidelity to office.  Id. at 26.  He notes that “intentional” and “conscious” 
should be interpreted as meaning “either that the manager was conscious that he was 
disregarding his duties or that a reasonable person in the manager’s position would have 
known that he was disregarding his duties” so that denial of subjective intent or awareness 
is not an adequate defense.  Id. at 72.   Eisenberg discusses Vice Chancellor Strine’s view 
that loyalty subsumes good faith, but rejects this view in favor of the three-way distinction.  
Id. at 12–13.  The Delaware Supreme court has confusingly come down on both sides of the 
question, referring to the three primary fiduciary duties in Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 
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good faith is less often a basis for liability than a threshold condition to 
remove protection of the business judgment rule.77  Delaware law does 
not allow exculpation or indemnification of bad faith actions.78 
6. Duty of Disclosure 
When the board requests shareholder action, shareholders have the 
right to make an informed decision, and directors have a specific duty to 
disclose accurately all available material information, which Delaware 
courts consider an instance of the duties of care, loyalty, and good faith, 
rather than a distinct fiduciary duty.79  The duties of care, loyalty, and 
good faith obligate directors to deal honestly with shareholders in any 
public or direct communication.80  Further, SEC Rule 14a-9 imposes 
liability for false or misleading disclosures in proxy statements.81 
7. Fiduciary Duties in Context 
Professor Stone attempts to resolve apparent contradictions in key 
decisions on fiduciary duty by identifying two distinct sets of powers 
                                                                                                             
634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1994); accord Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85, 90 (Del. 2001), 
but describing the requirement to act in good faith as a subsidiary element of the 
fundamental duty of loyalty in Stone, 911 A.2d at 370. 
77 Gilbert v. El Paso Co., 575 A.2d 1131, 1145 (Del. 1990) (requiring directors to 
demonstrate good faith before enjoying the presumption of the business judgment rule).  
See also Eisenberg, supra note 76, at 73. 
78 DEL. CODE tit. 8 § 102(b)(7) (2009) (allowing corporations to exculpate directors from 
monetary damages for breaches of the duty of care but explicitly excludes breaches of the 
duty of good faith and loyalty); § 145(a) (2009) (corporations may indemnify any person 
acting for the corporation if the person acted in good faith). 
79 Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 12 (Del. 1998) (disclosure duty is implicated when the 
board requests shareholder action, and the test applied is materiality of the information to 
the issue put before shareholders; the cause of action does not include reliance, causation, 
or actual damages).  Accord Stroud, 606 A.2d at 85 (duty to disclose material facts that 
would significantly affect the shareholder vote). 
80 Malone, 722 A.2d at 10 (reversing dismissal of complaint with prejudice, where there 
was evidence that directors knowingly made false disclosures).  The court held that 
directors violate their fiduciary duty if they “knowingly disseminate false information” 
that results in injury to the corporation or a shareholder, and stated that the director’s 
fiduciary duty is not intermittent but “the constant compass” to guide directors’ actions.  
Id. at 9–10.  Even when the board is not seeking shareholder action, the duties of care, good 
faith, and loyalty apply; dissemination of false information could violate one of those 
duties.  Id. at 13.  Accord O’Reilly v. Transworld Healthcare, Inc., 745 A.2d 902, 916 (1999). 
81  17 C.F.R. 240.14a-9 (2007).  Scienter is not required in proving a violation of Rule 14a-
9:  “a proxy solicitation that contains a misleading representation or omission violates the 
section even if the issuer believed in perfect good faith that there was nothing misleading 
in the proxy materials.”  Beck v. Dobrowski, 559 F.3d 681, 682 (7th Cir. 2009).  Pending rule 
changes to increase shareholders’ access to proxies will impose the same requirement on 
shareholders who nominate director candidates.  74 Fed. Reg. 29024 (June 18, 2009). 
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exercised by boards of directors—each having a distinct purpose that 
implies its own standard for fiduciary duty.82  He distinguishes a board’s 
operating power, through which a board makes or delegates decisions 
about conducting the corporation’s business affairs, from a coordinating 
power, the power to manage collective action by shareholders in voting 
or selling their shares.83  Powers and duties vary with context:  just as 
Revlon duties arise when it becomes clear a company is going to be sold, 
special board duties arise in the context of an election—these duties, 
such as the duty of disclosure, facilitate decisions that corporation law 
reserves for a shareholders’ vote rather than for a board’s judgment.84 
D. Holding Securities “in Street Name” 
The following sections discuss complex arrangements that 
developed over the last four decades to enable the growth and efficiency 
of modern securities markets—arrangements that in many respects clash 
with presumptions embodied in corporation law.85 First to be discussed 
                                                 
82 Stone, supra note 54, at 928.   Stone analyzes apparent inconsistency in the courts’ 
treatment of conflicts of interest and in whether fiduciary duty is owed to shareholders or 
to the corporate enterprise, especially in applying Unocal and Blasius doctrines, tracing 
differences between decisions to differences in the powers the board is exercising in each 
case.  Id. at 912. 
83 Id. at 913–17.  Citing various decisions of Delaware courts,  Stone argues that the 
courts recognize this distinction, even if they have not articulated it clearly.  Context alters 
a board’s fiduciary duties, just as it does in a case controlled by the Revlon rule.  See supra 
note 66 and accompanying text. 
84 Stone, supra note 54, at 900, 920.  The board’s role is to use its coordinating power to 
assist the shareholders to make their decision effectively, even if the board disagrees with 
the decision.  Id. at 924.  In short, the board’s role is ministerial—“involv[ing] obedience to 
instructions or laws instead of discretion, judgment, or skill . . . .”  BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 457 (3d pocket ed. 2006).  Chancellor Allen reasoned in Blasius: 
[T]he ordinary considerations to which the business judgment rule 
originally responded are simply not present in the shareholder voting 
context. . . .  A board’s decision to act to prevent the shareholders from 
creating a majority of new board positions and filling them does not 
involve the exercise of the corporation’s power over its property, or with 
respect to its rights or obligations; rather, it involves allocation, 
between shareholders as a class and the board, of effective power with 
respect to governance of the corporation. 
Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 660 (Del. Ch. 1988).   
85 Considerable complexity results from the interaction of three legal principles:   
 The only persons entitled to vote are registered owners on the 
record date . . . .   
 A beneficial holder who permits his or her shares to be held by 
another in nominee or fiduciary capacity relinquishes the direct right 
to participate in corporate affairs . . .  
 . . . [but] the record owner has no right to vote the shares contrary 
to the wishes of the beneficial owner.   
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is the arrangement by which the industry eliminated the transfer of 
paper share certificates.  Second is the now-ubiquitous practice of 
custodial shareholding by intermediaries, which complicates voting.  
Third is the convoluted set of procedures by which a corporation 
conducts a vote of shareholders when a vote is required.  Fourth is the 
procedure for counting the vote in corporate elections. 
1. “Immobilization” of Shares 
In times past, hundreds of messengers scurried around Wall Street 
transporting stock certificates and checks between offices; by the 1960s, 
this method of settling trades resulted in a back-office crisis that 
forestalled further growth of the markets and even forced the stock 
exchanges to severely cut back trading hours.86  Beginning in the early 
1970s, the industry developed a solution:  by “immobilizing” physical 
stock certificates in a central depository and recording changes of 
ownership using book-entry accounting methods, they could eliminate 
the bottleneck attendant to paper-based transactions.87 
In the United States today, about 85% of shares are held in street 
name by brokers or banks, for themselves or as custodians for customers, 
rather than being registered with the issuing company.88  These shares 
are deposited with The Depository Trust Company (“DTC”), which 
keeps track of who owns them by electronic bookkeeping entries; DTC’s 
affiliate Cede & Co. is the shareholder of record on the issuing 
                                                                                                             
A. Gilchrist Sparks III & Michael Houghton, The Mechanics of Stockholder Voting Under 
Delaware Law, and Conducting an Annual Stockholders’ Meeting of a Delaware Corporation, in 
SHAREHOLDER MEETINGS AND SHAREOWNER CONTROL IN TODAY’S SECURITIES MARKETS, at 
433, 435 (PLI Corp. L. and Practice, Course Handbook Series No. 507, 1985). 
86 David C. Donald, The Rise and Effects of the Indirect Holding System: How Corporate 
America Ceded its Shareholders to Intermediaries, Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universität, 
Institute for Law and Finance, Working Paper No. 68, 9–10 (2007), 
http://publikationen.ub.uni-frankfurt.de/volltexte/2007/4885/pdf/ILF_WP_068.pdf.  
From 1960 to 1968 trading volume quadrupled; the back-office crisis was brokers’ inability 
to settle the transactions.  Id. at 10.  In some brokerage firms, the backlog of transactions 
grew to exceed in value the firms’ total assets.  Id. at 9.  Over 100 firms failed or were 
acquired.  Id.  It took four years after one firm was liquidated to sort out its backlog of 
paper transactions.  Id. at 12. 
87 15 U.S.C. § 78q-1(e) (2000) (as amended in 1975, § 17A(e) of the Securities and 
Exchange Act requires all exchange-traded securities to be immobilized); see also Donald, 
supra note 86, at 17-19.  Donald observes that intermediaries in effect replaced corporations 
as the “issuers” of the dematerialized “securities,” which were then transferred as claims 
against their custody accounts; they also replaced shareholders as the persons registered on 
corporations’ stockholders lists.  Id. 
88 SEC, Briefing Paper:  Roundtable on Proxy Voting Mechanics (May 23, 2007), 
http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/proxyprocess/proxyvotingbrief.htm. 
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company’s stock register.89  When investors buy and sell shares in a 
brokerage account, DTC settles trades by calculating each day the net 
change in brokers’ and banks’ share balances; brokers and banks 
perform similar net accounting for purchases and sales in their 
customers’ accounts through as many tiers of custodial relationship as 
necessary.90 
This “indirect holding system” streamlined the process of clearing 
trades at the cost of obscuring share ownership:  under this system, the 
true beneficial owner who holds equitable title91 is not the record 
shareholder that state corporation laws recognize.92  Besides obscuring 
the owner’s identity, indirect holding also obscures the quantity owned.  
Although corporation law (like the naïve investor) views a shareholder 
                                                 
89 Donald, supra note 86, at 23.  See also Depository Trust & Clearing Corp., An 
Introduction to DTCC Services and Capabilities 3 (April 2008), http://www.dtcc.com/ 
downloads/about/Introduction_to_DTCC.pdf (DTC retains custody of 3.5 million 
securities issues, worth about $40 trillion, including securities issued in the US and more 
than 110 other countries); Depository Trust & Clearing Corp., 2007 Transaction Statistics and 
Performance, http://www.dtcc.com/about/business/statistics.php (In 2007, DTC’s affiliate, 
National Securities Clearing Corp., settled 13.5 billion securities transactions valued at 
more than $1.8 quadrillion). 
90 John C. Wilcox, John J. Purcell III, & Hye-Won Choi, “Street Name” Registration & The 
Proxy Solicitation Process, in A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO SEC PROXY AND COMPENSATION RULES 
12-6 (Amy L. Goodman & John F. Olson eds., 3rd ed. Supp. 2007) (in most transactions, 
DTC legally owns shares both before and after the trade, merely shifting them between 
accounts of intermediaries).  See also Prefatory Note to UCC § 8-101 (1994). 
91 Prefatory Note to UCC § 8-101 (1994); UCC §§ 8-102(7), 8-102(17) and comment 17 
(1994). The holder of shares in street name holds a security entitlement, effective when the 
intermediary (a broker, bank, or trustee) credits acquired shares to the shareholder’s 
account.  UCC § 8-501(b) (1994).  This security entitlement is not a claim to specific 
property, but rather the right to enforce a claim against the intermediary to deliver all 
property rights associated with the shares.  UCC § 8-503(b) and comment 2.  The beneficial 
owner holds the entitlement in common with other entitlement holders, each having a pro 
rata claim against the intermediary’s holdings of the security.  Id. comment 1.  Under the 
indirect holding rules, it is immaterial whether the intermediary actually owns sufficient 
shares that it can credit to the beneficial owners.  Id.; UCC § 8-501(c) (1994).  In those 
instances, now rare, where beneficial owners are also owners of record, the lack of an 
account record with an intermediary means traditional property law applies to the holding 
rather than the UCC Article 8 rules.  See also Wilcox et al., supra note 90, at 12-3 (DTC is 
merely custodian and has no beneficial interest in shares).  See generally Kahan & Rock, 
supra note 45, at 1240–43 (summarizing provisions of UCC Article 8 that are relevant to the 
indirect holding system).  
92 DEL. CODE tit. 8 § 219(c) (2009) (stock ledger the only evidence as to who are the 
stockholders); § 262 (2009) (allowing only the record owner to claim appraisal rights); see 
Shaw v. Agri-Mark, Inc., 663 A.2d 464, 469–70 (Del. 1995) (continuing to recognize rule that 
a corporation may rely on its stock ledger to determine who is eligible to vote or exercise 
other rights of a stockholder); accord Berlin v. Emerald Partners, 552 A.2d 482, 494 (Del. 1989) 
(record ownership determines who may vote); Williams v. Sterling Oil of Okla., Inc., 267 
A.2d 630, 634 (Del. Ch. 1970) (“exclusive right of registered owners to vote”), rev’d on other 
grounds, 273 A.2d 264 (Del. 1971). 
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as owner of a determinate number of shares, under Article 8 of the 
Uniform Commercial Code, what the shareholder legally owns is a pro 
rata interest, in common with all other customers of the broker, in a 
fungible mass of like securities that the broker holds.93  The fungible 
mass is a continually varying quantity of shares held by custodians, with 
no specific shares being attributed to specific customers.94  As a result, 
the number of shares shown in a customer’s account only approximates 
the number of shares that the customer is legally entitled to vote. 
2. Assignment of Proxy 
Assigning a proxy establishes a seemingly straightforward agency 
relationship, by which the owner of shares grants authority to another to 
vote the shares according to the owner’s instructions.95  But the 
                                                 
93 UCC § 8-503 (1994); SEC, supra note 88.  See also UCC § 8-511 (1994) (although the 
beneficial owner’s claim to the financial asset is superior to claims of general creditors, 
purchasers of that security from the broker and creditors who obtained a security interest 
have claims superior to the beneficial owner’s claim). 
94 In re Appraisal of Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc. No. Civ. A. 1554-CC, 2007 WL 1378345 
(Del. Ch. May 2, 2007), at *2 (“[N]o investor who might ultimately have a beneficial interest 
in securities registered to Cede, has any ownership rights to any particular share of stock 
reflected on a certificate held by Cede.”).  See supra note 91. 
95 DEL. CODE tit. 8 § 212(b) (2009) (authorizes shareholders to appoint a proxy); Duffy v. 
Loft, 151 A. 223, 227 (Del. Ch. 1930), aff’d 152 A. 849 (Del. 1930) (appointment of proxy 
creates agency relationship, of which proxy card is evidence); McLain v. Lanova Corp., 39 
A.2d 209, 212 (Del. Ch. 1944) (“[T]he holder of a proxy is an agent, and, within the scope of 
his authority, has a certain fiduciary relation toward his principal . . . .”); accord Parshalle v. 
Roy, 567 A.2d 19, 27 (Del. Ch. 1989) (“A ‘proxy’ or ‘proxy card’ is merely written evidence 
of an agency relationship in which a principal [the shareholder of record entitled to vote] 
authorizes an agent . . . to vote the principal’s shares with respect to the matters and in the 
manner specified in the proxy.”).  The proxyholder’s agency powers are limited by terms 
granted in the proxy: 
A stockholder who is present in person or represented . . . by a general 
proxy is present for quorum purposes and is also voting power present 
on all matters.  However, if the stockholder is represented by a limited 
proxy and does not empower its holder to vote on a particular 
proposal, then the shares represented by that proxy cannot be 
considered as part of the voting power present with respect to that 
proposal. 
Berlin, 552 A.2d at 493.  In North Fork Bancorp. v. Toal the court held (making a finer 
distinction than in Berlin) that a limited proxy that withholds authority to vote for a 
proposal does not withhold all voting power but only power to cast a particular vote on 
that question, and so is properly considered voting power present with respect to that 
proposal.  825 A.2d 860, 868–69 (Del. Ch. 2000), aff’d 781 A.2d 693 (Del. 2001). 
 It is apparent that recent cases treating proxy assignment powers either maintain the 
now-obsolete presumption that a legal owner with the power to assign a proxy is also the 
beneficial owner or use the term ‘proxy’ indiscriminately to denote either proxy or voting 
instructions. 
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discrepancy between legal and beneficial ownership, involving tiers of 
intermediaries, complicates matters.96   Although the registered owner 
has the legal right to vote and to assign that right (a proxy), the beneficial 
owner has the right in equity to direct how proxyholders vote (through 
voting instructions, sometimes confusingly called assignment of 
proxy).97  Assignment of proxy creates an elaborate agency relationship 
that runs in a chain from the legal owner (usually Cede & Co.) through 
intermediary brokers and banks and Broadridge to the beneficial 
owner.98  Voting instructions create an elaborate agency relationship 
running in the reverse direction.99  But—just as with directors’ fiduciary 
duties in conducting elections fairly— proxyholders’ fiduciary duties as 
agents are theoretical only, because the courts hold that the beneficial 
owner bears the risk of a proxyholder’s errors in voting.100 
                                                 
96 See supra notes 90–92 and accompanying text. 
97 Freeman v. Fabiniak, No. Civ. A. 8035, 1985 WL 11583 (Del.Ch. Aug. 15, 1985) 
(holding it inequitable to allow a mere record holder to vote shares contrary to the true 
owner’s wishes); SEC Rule 14A-4(e), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-4(e) (2007) (providing that shares 
be voted in accordance with beneficial owner’s instructions).  See NYSE Rule 452, 
http://rules.nyse.com/nysetools/Exchangeviewer.asp?SelectedNode=chp_1_2&manual=
/nyse/ nyse_rules/nyse-rules/ (last visited Aug. 11, 2009) (“A member organization shall 
give or authorize the giving of a proxy for stock registered in its name, or in the name of its 
nominee, at the direction of the beneficial owner[,]” and “[w]here a member organization 
gives a subsequent proxy, it should clearly indicate whether the proxy is in addition to, in 
substitution for or in revocation of any prior proxy.”).  See also Len v. Fuller, No.  Civ. A. 
15352, 1997 WL 305833 at *3–5 (Del. Ch. May 30, 1997) (in a close election contest, court 
applied doctrine of equitable conversion to determine voting rights, ruling that an 
equitable owner of shares had the right to compel a proxy from the record owner, where 
the equitable owner had exercised a call option for the record owner’s shares but the sale 
transaction had not yet closed). 
98 See Wilcox et al., supra note 90, at 12-3, 12-7, 12-9 to 12-10 (outlining the “daisy-chain” 
of relationships).  Only very rarely and on special request is proxy authority transferred all 
the way to the ultimate beneficial owners, who thus do not have any legal right to vote their 
shares; the legal right is retained by the broker or bank. 
99 North Fork Bancorp., 825 A.2d at 868 (“[O]ne must look to the language 
on . . . the . . . proxy cards [i.e., voting instruction forms] to determine the nature and extent 
of the agency relationship created.”).  See supra note 32; infra note 107. 
100 Am. Hardware Corp. v. Savage Arms Corp., 136 A.2d 690, 692 (Del. 1957) (noting the 
NYSE rule approvingly, but determining that the shareholder bore the risk of any failure of 
a broker to fulfill voting instructions); Enstar Corp. v. Senouf, 535 A.2d 1351, 1354–55 (Del. 
1987) (because street name registration is voluntary, shareholder must bear risks attendant 
on holding shares through nominees; intermediary’s error in failing to make demand for 
appraisal in name of record owner disqualified demand); Mainiero v. Microbyx Corp., 699 
A.2d 320, 324 (Del. Ch. 1997) (investor choosing to hold shares other than as record owner 
assumes risk); see also McLain v. Lanova Corp., 39 A.2d 209 (Del. Ch. 1944) (in the absence 
of inequitable circumstances, the record owner can vote the stock); Duffy v. Loft, Inc., 151 
A. 223 227 (Del. Ch. 1930) (authorized agents’ failure to produce and file their proxies at 
stockholders meeting did not of itself destroy authority).  But cf. Allison v. Preston, 651 
A.2d 772 (Del. Ch. 1994), aff’d sub nom. Preston v. Allison, 650 A.2d 646, 649 (Del. 1994) 
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If a beneficial owner does not provide voting instructions, stock 
exchange rules have allowed the broker to vote the shares on routine 
matters, usually following the Wall Street Rule, which presumes that 
shareholders uniformly support management—and that if not, they 
would sell their shares.101  (Effective for annual meetings scheduled after 
January 1, 2010, the New York Stock Exchange abolished broker 
discretionary voting for the election of directors.)102 
If a beneficial owner withholds authority to vote for a director 
candidate, the effect can vary.  Because default rules prescribe plurality 
voting, in an uncontested election of directors, a single favorable vote 
suffices to elect the board’s candidate, and a shareholder’s decision to 
cast votes for or withhold votes from an incumbent candidate makes no 
difference whatsoever.103  On occasions when a majority vote is required, 
withholding authority means the shares are considered present and 
entitled to vote, but no vote will be recorded for them; because this 
increases the denominator but not the numerator, in effect it counts 
against the candidate.104 
                                                                                                             
(confirming the general rule that a beneficial stockholder is afforded no relief if the agent 
errs but enforcing the agent’s duty to vote according to a beneficial owner’s wishes because 
nominee holding of shares was obligatory rather than voluntary under federal ERISA law); 
Insituform of N. Am., Inc. v. Chandler, 534 A.2d 257, 271 (Del.Ch. 1987) (trustees and 
investment managers, as distinguished from pure nominees, are not bound to follow 
beneficial owner’s wishes).  In the risk-of-proxyholder-error cases, it is apparent that what 
the court calls a “proxy” is the voting instruction that the beneficial owner gave to the 
intermediary, rather than the legal proxy that Cede & Co. assigned as record owner. 
101 NYSE Rule 452, supra note 97.  In opposition to the Wall Street rule,  Bebchuk argues 
that “for shareholders concerned that poor board performance is reducing the value of 
their investment, the freedom to sell their shares [at a depressed price] is hardly an 
adequate remedy.”  Bebchuk, supra note 26, at 141. 
102 SEC Release No. 34-60215 (July 1, 2009) approved, with amendments, changes to 
NYSE Rule 452 that the NYSE first  proposed in 2006. 
103 DEL. CODE tit. 8 § 216(3) (2009) (unless bylaws provide otherwise, directors will be 
elected by a plurality of votes of shares present and entitled to vote).  See generally 
American Bar Association, Section of Business Law, Committee on Corporate Laws, 
Discussion Paper on Voting by Shareholders for the Election of Directors, June 22, 2005, 
http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/committees/CL270000pub/directorvoting/200506210000
00.pdf (discussing the historical fear of failed elections owing to insufficient votes to satisfy 
a majority standard).  See Velasco, supra note 27, at 612 (noting that incumbent directors are 
effectively immune to a shareholder vote and considers it misleading to say there is an 
election or right to vote). 
104 See DEL. CODE tit. 8 § 216(2) (2009) (requires affirmative vote of the majority of shares 
present in person or represented by proxy at the meeting and entitled to vote on the subject 
matter for approval of proposals other than election of directors, unless otherwise 
stipulated in the company’s charter or bylaws).  See generally Licht v. Storage Technology 
Corp., No. Civ. A. 524-N, 2005 WL 1252355 (Del. Ch. May 13, 2005) (summarizing the effect 
of voting instructions and abstentions in various kinds of contests); Wilcox et al., supra note 
90, at 12-16 (presenting a summary table of vote-tabulation rules); Catherine T. Dixon, The 
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3. Proxy Statements 
When a shareholder meeting approaches, state and federal laws 
require a board of directors to communicate to shareholders the 
substance of any matters subject to a vote.105  Delaware corporation law 
envisions a simple process:  Step 1, look in the official stockholders list 
for names and addresses; Step 2, send the materials to those persons at 
those addresses.106  But this is of course unrealistic; under the “indirect 
holding system,” beneficial owners are traceable only through accounts 
on the books of a pyramid of intermediaries.107  Even if communication 
with owners could be simplified, solicitation of proxy or voting 
instructions still must pass through each intermediary:  to be legally 
valid, the power of agency must bind each intermediary in an unbroken 
chain between the record owner and the beneficial owner.108 
To eliminate the cost and delay that a series of one-to-one handoffs 
would entail, both issuers and intermediaries assign power of attorney to 
Broadridge Financial Solutions to distribute disclosure information to 
beneficial owners and to collect their voting instructions.109  Acting as the 
                                                                                                             
SEC’s Expanded Requirements:  Disclosure of Proxy Voting Tabulation Procedures and Results, 7 
INSIGHTS 11, 16 (Dec. 1993) (including a table comparing rules for tabulating votes under 
various states’ laws). 
105 SEC Rule 14(b), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14(b); DEL. CODE tit. 8 § 222 (2009). 
106 DEL. CODE tit. 8 § 219(a) (2009); see also Donald, supra note 86, at 27; Soc’y of Corporate 
Secy’s & Governance Prof’ls, supra note 46, at 1 (current proxy system is based on obsolete 
assumptions that shareholders have a long-term economic interest, register their shares, 
and trade rarely; its defects had less impact in former conditions than today). 
107 Supra notes 88–90; see also Kahan & Rock, supra note 45, at 1242 (noting that the 
Delaware voting paradigm does not take account of the modern system of custodial 
ownership, particularly the indeterminacy of share ownership under UCC Article 8); cf. 
Donald, supra note 86, at 63 (although masking of the beneficial owner’s identity was 
incidental to the indirect holding system, brokers treat their customer lists as proprietary 
information and resist sharing it with issuing companies); Soc’y of Corporate Sec’ys & 
Governance Prof’ls, supra note 46, at 5 (proxy communication and voting processes favor 
interests of brokers and banks rather than interest of beneficial owners). 
108 See supra notes 99–100 and accompanying text on establishing a relationship of agency 
by assigning proxy.  The laws of agency apply to the proxy authority:  the proxy, qua agent, 
consents to act on behalf of the beneficial owner and subject to the beneficial owner’s 
control.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1 (1958).  As the voting instructions pass 
through intermediaries to the record owner or proxyholder who will cast the actual votes, 
each intermediary is bound as a subagent (“a person appointed by an agent empowered to 
do so, to perform functions undertaken by the agent for the principal”).  Id. § 5. 
109 Broadridge Financial Solutions, Inc., ProxyEdge, http://www.broadridge.com/ 
investor-communications/us/institutions/proxyedge.asp (Broadridge is the proxy agent 
for 97% of U.S. banks and brokers).  Although some other providers compete for some of 
the services, because of Broadridge’s dominant market position, this Note will refer to 
Broadridge as the provider of proxy distribution and tabulation services.  See also Obara, 
supra note 25, at 10-2.  See also Soc’y of Corporate Sec’ys & Governance Prof’ls, supra note 
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agent of both issuer and intermediaries, Broadridge can compile mailing 
lists and distribute proxy information and voting instruction forms 
(“VIFs”) on their behalf110 without compromising confidentiality 
required under Objecting Beneficial Owners rules that mask the 
identities of a custodian’s customers.111 
E. Conducting Corporate Meetings and Elections 
The corporate election process is presented here step by step, 
somewhat simplified, followed by a discussion of factors that contribute 
to difficulty or confusion in counting the vote. 
1. Corporate Elections, Step by Step 
THE ELECTION PROCESS, STEP BY STEP112 
1 When an issuer announces a corporate election, it must identify 
intermediaries holding its stock and ask them how many proxy 
material packages they require for beneficial owners.113 
2 The issuer issues an “omnibus proxy,” which confers voting 
authority to banks and brokers with respect to the shares in their 
DTC accounts on the record date.114  Brokers and banks transfer 
                                                                                                             
46, at 5 (commenting on lack of competition and lack of incentive to contain costs of proxy-
related services because issuers pay for services that other parties price, procure, and 
perform). 
110 SEC, supra note 88. 
111 SEC Rules 14b-1(b)(3) (beneficial owners may choose whether to be either Objecting 
Beneficial Owners [OBOs] or Non-Objecting Beneficial Owners [NOBOs], applying to 
brokers), 14b-2(b)(4)(ii)(B) (same, applying to banks).  See also Donald, supra note 86, at 63 
(although beneficial owners may have reasons to mask their identities from issuers, default 
OBO provisions in brokerage account agreements apparently serve brokers’ interest:  about 
three fourths of beneficial owners are considered OBO, and brokers say releasing NOBO 
lists would endanger their customers’ privacy, even though 88% of shareholders would 
unconditionally provide the information to issuers).  Cf. Bus. Roundtable, Request for 
Rulemaking Concerning Shareholder Communications, Letter to SEC dated April 12, 2004, at 11, 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/petn4-493.htm#P45_11983 (proposing that investors 
who care about anonymity should bear the cost rather than pass the costs on to all 
shareholders). 
112 See Obara, supra note 33; see also Donald, supra note 86, at 29–33 (summarizing 
customary procedures used in conducting corporate elections). 
113 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-13(a)–(a)(1)(i)(A); 240.14a-13(a)(4)–(5); 240.14a-13, Note 1.  
Determining beneficial owners is an iterative process that may involve multiple layers of 
respondent banks and regional brokers.  Donald, supra note 86, at 25. 
114 Wilcox et al., supra note 90, at 12-7.  The issuer ordinarily acts through custodian Cede 
& Co., which is the legal or record owner of shares.  Id. at 12-10 to 12-11.  Although banks 
and brokers are assigned voting rights, stock exchange rules deny brokers (and contractual 
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their proxy authority, through power of attorney, to 
Broadridge.115 
3 The issuer sends proxy disclosure packets to Broadridge for 
distribution (on behalf of intermediaries) to beneficial owners.116  
Broadridge sends required disclosures concerning questions 
subject to a shareholder vote and a voting instruction form 
VIF.117  (By contracting with intermediaries as well as issuers, 
Broadridge can reduce cost and delay.) 
4 The beneficial owner returns to Broadridge a VIF—general (in 
favor of management’s proposals); limited (instructions to vote 
in some other indicated way); or none.118  Until the polls close, 
the beneficial owner may change voting instructions. 
5 Broadridge tabulates incoming VIFs, and reports the 
continuously updated master tabulation of voting results to 
intermediaries and the issuer (but generally not to the 
opposition).119  It is not customary for any party in this process 
                                                                                                             
provisions usually deny banks) the right to decide how to vote.  Id. at 12-8.  Cf. Kahan & 
Rock, supra note 45, at 1254 (no effort is made at this step to reconcile inconsistent records 
of share positions among the issuer’s stock register, the Cede & Co. list, and the internal 
records of custodians). 
115 Wilcox et al., supra note 90, at 12-10; Broadridge Financial Solutions, Inc. Annual 
Report (Form 10-K), at 7 (Aug. 23, 2007). 
116 17 CFR § 240.14b-1(c)(2)(i) requires issuers to reimburse intermediaries for the cost of 
distributing proxy materials.  Rule 14b-2 establishes a corresponding requirement for bank 
intermediaries.  Id. § 240.14b-2(a)(5)(c)(2)(i). 
117 Wilcox et al., supra note 90, at 12-10.  It is significant that beneficial owners receive a 
voting instruction form rather than a proxy card.  Id.  The broker retains the legal right to 
vote shares or to grant proxy authority, and beneficial owners have the right only to 
instruct the proxyholder how to vote their shares.  Id.  See also Bus. Roundtable, supra note 
111, at 5. 
118 See Wilcox et al., supra note 90, at 12-12 to 12-13; SEC, supra note 88; Kahan & Rock, 
supra note 45, at 1247–48; Broadridge, supra note 109.  In principle, the beneficial owner 
returns voting instructions to the broker or bank, but in practice most voting instructions 
are collected by Broadridge through ProxyEdge®, its proprietary web-based voting facility, 
or by mail.  Broadridge, supra note 109.  Broadridge acts for the intermediaries under 
power of attorney.  Id.  ProxyEdge® uses a unique tracking number (functionally 
comparable to a signature) for each beneficial owner, to authenticate instructions, reconcile 
multiple instructions from the same beneficial owner, and report on aggregated vote 
counts by categories of beneficial owners.  Id.  ProxyEdge® is a registered trademark of 
Broadridge Financial Solutions, Inc.  Id. 
119 Cf. Broadridge Financial Solutions, Inc., 2008 Corporate Issuer Services Guide 26, 
http://www.broadridge.com/investor-communications/us/corporations/pdfs/Part%205 
%20Vote%20Proc%20Stp3.pdf.  Broadridge’s service description continues: 
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to issue written confirmation of voting instructions received (or 
of how a proxyholder actually voted a beneficial owner’s 
shares). 
6 The broker or bank sends Broadridge a proxy, or a series of 
incremental partial proxies, indicating aggregated shares voted 
for and against each proposal or candidate.120  Discrepancies 
often arise.121  If an overvote develops, the intermediary should 
                                                                                                             
Broadridge issues voting results on behalf of our bank and broker 
clients based on the schedule [fifteen days before the meeting, ten days 
before the meeting, daily beginning on the ninth day before the 
meeting, 7:00 p.m. the day before the meeting, and morning of the 
meeting]. The voting results are issued on a “client proxy” and 
provided to you or your designated agent. The voting results reported 
reflect instructions received from beneficial shareholders and broker 
discretionary voting if applicable. All share amounts are provided to 
Broadridge by its bank and broker clients and are reflected on the 
client proxy without modification by Broadridge. 
Id. at 25. 
 Access to these progress reports enables management to redouble its proxy 
solicitation efforts if votes received so far are not favorable with a comfortable margin.  
Sometimes the insurgent opposition is led by an institutional investor that can obtain 
reports direct from Broadridge or through its broker.  However, institutional investors 
have complained that reporting available from intermediaries “was not sufficiently robust 
to guarantee that the information genuinely reflected their voting intentions . . . .  [In one 
instance, perplexed about a reported split vote,] [t]he investor called Broadridge to 
investigate further, and was told there was no way of telling how the vote had been split.”  
Thompson-Mann, supra note 13, at 11. 
 There is evidence that “[w]hen a retail shareowner using Broadridge’s proxyvote.com 
platform votes for or against at least one item on a proxy but fails to vote on other items, 
each item they fail to vote is cast in favor of the company’s recommended position.”  James 
McRitchie, SEC Petition 4-583 at 2 (May 15, 2009).  This practice arguably does not comply 
with SEC Rule 14a-4(b)(1), which requires prominent notice to the beneficial owner how 
unspecified votes will be cast.  Id.  Representing Corporate Governance, McRitchie 
petitioned the SEC to amend the rule to require that voter information forms, as well as 
proxies, bind fiduciaries and warn security holders of the effect of their voting instructions.  
Id. at 1.  Broadridge’s defense relies on the technical distinction between a proxy and voting 
instructions.  Id. at 2. 
120 Obara, supra note 33, at 10-13.  See Kahan & Rock, supra note 45, at 1253–54; see also 
NYSE Rule 452, supra note 97, which has until now allowed a broker to vote on 
discretionary questions (including an uncontested election of directors) for all street name 
shares it holds for which it (or Broadridge) received no VIF, but may vote only in 
accordance with the beneficial owner’s instructions on non-discretionary questions.  For 
the new revision of Rule 452, see supra note 102 and accompanying text.  Cf. Wilcox et al., 
supra note 90, at 12-8 to 12-9 (remarking that the NYSE appears to permit the practice of 
brokers assigning voting instructions received to any shares held [in the fungible mass], so 
long as there is no overvote). 
121 Obara, supra note 33, at 10-13.  See, e.g., In re Deutsche Bank Securities Inc., Request for 
Review of Exchange Hearing Panel Decision 05-045, 2006 WL 760710 *1–*3 (NYSE Feb. 15, 
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amend its proxy to vote no more than the number of shares it is 
entitled to vote; Broadridge forwards the proxies collected in 
this way to the tabulator.122 
UNCONTESTED 
“ROUTINE”ELECTION 
CONTESTED ELECTION OR PROXY 
FIGHT 
7a The tabulator (often 
Broadridge) forwards 






7b Each faction, having obtained 
its proxies from Broadridge, 
delivers them to the inspector 
of election, who takes them to a 
secure, neutral counting room. 
8a The inspector of 
election oversees the 
validation and 
counting of proxies to 
verify legality of the 
8b Proxies from registered owners 
are segregated from broker and 
bank proxies, and are sorted 
into the same order as the 
stockholder list.  Each of the 
                                                                                                             
2006) (NYSE fined Deutsche Bank for rule violations after investigation found overvotes in 
twelve of fifteen instances tested in 2002 and eleven of twelve in 2003).  See also Soc’y of 
Corporate Sec’ys & Governance Prof’ls, supra note 46, at 3 (noting lack of verifiable audit 
trail for votes and lack of any guarantee that beneficial owners will receive proxy materials 
or have their votes counted). 
122 SEC, supra note 88 (“If there is an over-vote, the broker-dealer will have to decrease 
the customers’ vote but the customers will never know some or all of their votes did not 
count.”).  See also Kahan & Rock, supra note 45, at 1260 (“cutting down the number of 
voting instructions to the number of shares the broker is entitled to vote means that 
someone (who?) must decide whose votes count”). 
123 Stock exchange enforcement decisions are revealing:   
There are no standard industry procedures that govern Tabulators’ 
approach to dealing with over-voting.  Tabulators may respond to 
over-votes with a variety of vote-counting procedures, including 
counting votes on a “first in-first voted” or “last in-first voted” basis, 
or disregarding altogether a vote submitted by a broker-dealer.  
Depending upon the procedure implemented by the Tabulator, certain 
customers’ voting instructions may not be represented as originally 
given. . . .  The lack of any uniform procedure raises the possibility that 
Tabulators may employ procedures that cause votes to be lost. 
NYSE Hearing Panel Decision 06-055 at *4, *6 (Apr. 18, 2006) (adjudication imposing 
censure and a $600,000 fine where broker voted more shares than it was entitled to vote); 
see also NYSE Hearing Panel Decision 07-028 at *1 (Mar. 8, 2007) (assessing $325,000 fine for 
a similar infraction).  It is worth noting that to the offending firms fines of this magnitude 
are utterly insignificant, providing no incentive to alter their conduct. 
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election (that there was 
a quorum and the 
official vote count).124 
inspector’s assistants takes a 
group of proxies. 
9a The inspector examines 
proxies, excluding 
those that were not 
properly executed (for 
instance, lacking a 
signature).  Because the 
outcome is 
predetermined, little 
effort need be 
expended on validating 
proxies. 
9b The inspector’s staff examines 
registered owners’ proxies and 
checks them against the 
stockholder list, sorting proxies 
into five categories:  For 
management, For the 
opposition, Not on list 
(invalid), Set aside (missing 
signature, etc.), and Stand off 
(conflicting proxies).  The 
assistants count proxies for 
each faction and check each 
other’s work. 
10a The inspector totals 
votes cast for the 
management slate of 
director candidates. 
10b The staff attempts to resolve 
partial proxies and revocations 
for each intermediary.  If the 
result is an overvote, the staff 
requests the intermediary’s 
proxy clerk to bring the total 
number of votes in line with 
eligibility.  If an overvote 
cannot be resolved, the 
inspector may disqualify some 
or all of the intermediary’s 
shares.  The assistants count 
proxies for each faction and 
check each other’s work.125 
                                                 
124 DEL. CODE tit. 8 § 231(a) (2009) (corporations that list shares on a national exchange or 
have more than 2,000 record shareholders must appoint inspectors of election for any 
shareholders meeting; there are no statutory requirements for inspectors’ qualifications or 
independence); Obara, supra note 33, at 10-8. 
125 In the aggregation it is difficult to keep track of who has voted or changed a vote, 
causing the need to adjust the count for overvotes, revocations of proxies, errors by 
intermediaries, etc.  See also Kahan & Rock, supra note 45, at 1262 (discussing alternative 
ways that intermediaries resolve overvotes and resulting distortions in the vote tally).  
Kahan & Rock report that it is “entirely opaque” how Broadridge and its customers handle 
these adjustments.  Id. at 1253–54.  Because VIFs are technically not proxies, Inspectors of 
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11 The inspector totals the votes and certifies, in a report to the 
meeting chair, the number of shares present and the votes cast 
for and withheld from the proposals and slate(s) of candidates.  
Then, the meeting chair reports the vote count and announces 
the outcome—for instance, that there was a quorum, that certain 
candidates were duly elected directors, or that the merger 
proposal was approved. 
2. Factors That Confuse the Vote Count 
The complexity occasioned by multiple layers of nominee ownership 
leads to such errors as unclear or lost voting instructions, with the 
possibility for proxyholders to cast votes inconsistent with the beneficial 
owner’s intentions.126  In addition, the fact that proxyholders aggregate 
the voting instructions of multiple beneficial owners (which arrive and 
are processed piecemeal) makes it difficult or impossible to verify 
votes.127  Further, because key participants in this complex arrangement 
derive profits from their roles in the process, they have no incentive to 
streamline the layers.128 
In most elections, many beneficial owners, especially those who have 
small holdings, do not return voting instructions, resulting in an 
undervote.129  Because shareholders have the right, but not the duty, to 
vote their shares, the undervote does not affect legitimacy of the election, 
                                                                                                             
Election may not review these source documents in case of any dispute arising during the 
tabulation of voted proxies.  Wilcox et al., supra note 90, at 12-10. 
126 Brandes Institute, supra note 13 at *7 (votes gone missing hampered investors’ efforts 
to vote against excessive executive compensation); see also BALOTTI ET AL., supra note 25, at 
9-10.1; supra note 106 and accompanying text.  In Blasius, after reciting a virtual catalogue of 
proxy-handling and counting errors in a consent contest, Chancellor Allen observed that 
“[t]he multilevel system of beneficial ownership of stock and the interposition of other 
institutional players between investors and corporations . . .  renders the process of 
corporate voting complex.”  Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 668 (Del. Ch. 
1988).  In deciding the case, he concluded that “[w]e cannot know, in these circumstances, 
what the outcome of this close contest would have been if the true wishes of all beneficial 
owners had been accurately measured.  The parties must . . . be content with the result 
announced by the [inspectors].”  Id. at 670. 
127 Thompson-Mann, supra note 13, at 11 (reporting an occasion when Broadridge was 
not able to account for how a split vote—92% for, 8% against—arose, contrary to the 
institutional investor’s policy); Kahan & Rock, supra note 45, at 1253 (describing factors 
producing a “nightmare of verification”).  Problems arise because intermediaries submit 
aggregated partial proxies, obscuring the voting instructions of individual beneficial 
owners.  Id.   
128 Thompson-Mann, supra note 13, at 11. 
129 Inv. Assoc. v. Standard Power & Light Corp., 48 A.2d 501, 507 (Del. Ch. 1946) (taking 
judicial notice of fact that many shareholders fail to vote).  See also Bainbridge, supra note 
27, at 635 n.89 (discussing rational apathy among small shareholders). 
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but it may mask overvoting elsewhere.130  Under a soon-to-be obsolete 
part of NYSE Rule 452, if a broker did not receive a beneficial owner’s 
voting instructions on a routine question by ten days before the 
shareholders’ meeting, the broker could vote the customer’s shares in its 
own discretion.131 
Determining who has voting rights is often difficult because brokers 
lend shares from customers’ margin accounts to short sellers who sell 
them at today’s price in the hope of replacing the borrowed shares at a 
lower price later.132  When shares are lent, voting rights accompany 
them, even though the original owner thinks (and her brokerage 
statement will show) that the shares remain in her account.133  But 
                                                 
130 Cf. Berlin v. Emerald Partners, 552 A.2d 482, 493 (Del. 1989). 
131 NYSE Rule 452, supra note 97.  Routine questions include uncontested director 
elections and appointment of auditors.  Broker discretionary voting in director elections is 
eliminated in a revision to Rule 452 effective at annual meetings scheduled after Jan. 1, 
2010.  SEC Release No. 34-60215 at 2 (July 1, 2009). 
132 In re Digex, Inc., No. Civ. A. 18336-NC, 2002 WL 749184 at *2 (Del. Ch. Apr. 16, 2002) 
(concisely describing mechanism of short selling and its implications).  The court noted 
that: 
[w]ith regard to the share borrowed, both the shareholder from whom 
it was borrowed and the third party to whom the share was sold are 
beneficial owners.  It is probable, if not certain, that neither the issuer 
nor the beneficial owner from whom the stock was borrowed is aware 
of the short sale . . . .  Additionally, the borrowed share could be 
borrowed from the account of the third-party buyer and sold to yet 
another buyer.  This would create an additional, a third, beneficial 
owner for that one record share.  Conceivably, this serial borrowing 
could create a number of beneficial owners that was a multiple of the 
number of shares actually issued. 
Id. at *2 and n.9.  A margin account allows the customer to purchase shares with funds 
borrowed from the broker.  A typical brokerage account agreement states: 
[Broker] can loan out (to itself or others) the securities that collateralize 
your margin borrowing.  If it does, you may not be entitled to receive, 
with respect to securities that are lent, certain benefits that normally 
accrue to a securities owner, such as the ability to exercise voting 
rights, or to receive interest, dividends, or other distributions. 
Fidelity Investments, The Fidelity Account Customer Agreement 8, http://personal. 
fidelity.com/accounts/pdf/trust_supplemental.pdf.  It is evident how this practice can 
produce discrepancies in share counts and voting rights.  A concise account of the use of 
borrowed shares to affect elections and manipulate share prices is Kara Scannell, How 
Borrowed Shares Swing Company Votes, WALL ST. J., Jan. 26, 2007, at A1, based on Henry T.C. 
Hu & Bernard Black, The New Vote Buying: Empty Voting and Hidden (Morphable) Ownership, 
79 S. CAL. L. REV. 811, 832–35 (2006); see also William L. Tolbert, Jr., Leslie H. Lepow & John 
F. Cox, Borrowed Voting (American Enterprise Institute), 11 BRIEFLY . . . :  PERSPECTIVES ON 
LEGISLATION, REGULATION, AND LITIGATION, No. 8, 1–21 2008. 
133 NYSE Information Memo No. 07-8,  Disclosure of Voting Loss and Dividend Status in 
Margin Accounts (Jan. 23, 2007), http://apps.nyse.com/commdata/PubInfoMemos.nsf/ 
0/85256FCB005E19E88525726B00619047/$FILE/Microsoft%20Word%20-%20Document% 
20in%2007-8.pdf.  See also SEC, supra note 88; Kahan & Rock, supra note 45, at 1256–57 (the 
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because the broker holds its own and customers’ shares in fungible bulk 
at DTC,134 it does not decrement the lent shares from any particular 
customer’s account, and there is no principled way to reconcile the 
number of shares to which any account owns voting rights.135 
Delaware courts have long been permissive in allowing the buying 
and selling of votes, and in today’s markets it is possible to accumulate 
effective voting power in secret using complex financial derivatives to 
separate voting rights from economic interest.136  An example, involving 
                                                                                                             
loan is actually a transfer of full legal title under an agreement to repurchase the shares, 
and the possibly inadvertent lender thereby loses voting rights); Soc’y of Corporate Sec’ys 
& Governance Prof’ls, supra note 46, at 3 (in issuers’ view, integrity of the vote is impaired 
by counting voting instructions for loaned shares and assigning them arbitrarily to unvoted 
shares:  for this reason, some shares are voted multiple times, others not at all); Tolbert et 
al., supra note 132.  Proxy solicitations typically disclose the possibility that the number of 
shares to be voted may be adjusted downward, but this notice is often far from 
conspicuous—for example, on the voting instruction form for the Foundry Networks, Inc. 
special meeting on Dec. 17, 2008, this information is printed in light grey ink in small print 
(eight-point small capitals) on the reverse side of the form.  See supra note 37.  Kahan & 
Rock comment that short selling raises doubt whether votes were cast by investors who 
actually owned shares, adducing the example that in 2004 the AXA/MONY merger was 
approved by a margin of 1.7 million shares although 6.2 million shares were out on loan.  
Supra note 45, at 1263. 
134 See supra notes 93–94 and accompanying text. 
135 SEC, supra note 88.  See NYSE Information Memo No. 04-58, Supervision of Proxy 
Activities and Over-Voting, Nov. 5, 2004, http://apps.nyse.com/commdata/PubInfoMemos. 
nsf/AllPublishedInfoMemosNyseCom/85256F09007311B485256F3F00645587/$FILE/Micr
osoft%20Word%20-%20Document%20in%2004-58.pdf (evidence that overvoting arises 
from failures in accounting for lent shares); NYSE, NYSE Regulation, Inc. Fines UBS 
Securities, Goldman Sachs Execution & Clearing, and Credit Suisse Securities (USA) $1.35 Million 
for Proxy-Handling Violations in Corporate Elections, NYSE News Release, June 13, 2006, 
http://www.nyse.com/press/1150107128723.html. 
136 Vote-buying arrangements, once considered a breach of shareholders’ fiduciary duty 
to each other, have been allowed for over sixty years.  Schreiber v. Carney, 447 A.2d 17, 25 
(Del.Ch. 1982) (“an agreement involving the transfer of stock voting rights without the 
transfer of ownership is not necessarily illegal[;] . . . [t]o hold otherwise would be to exalt 
form over substance”), citing Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Circus Combined Shows, 
Inc., v. Ringling, 53 A.2d 441, 447 (Del. 1947) (“a shareholder may exercise wide liberality of 
judgment in the matter of voting . . . so long as he violates no duty owed his fellow 
shareholders.”).  Although shareholders may buy and sell votes, for management to use 
corporate assets to buy votes and tilt a close election is a breach of the duty of loyalty.  
Portnoy v. Cryo-Cell Int’l, Inc., 940 A.2d 43, 74–75 (Del. Ch. 2008). 
 A modern case involving derivatives is CSX Corp. v. The Children’s Inv. Fund Mgmt. 
(UK) LLP, 562 F. Supp. 2d 511 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), aff’d 292 Fed. Appx. 133 (2d Cir. 2008) (in 
spite of disclosure violations, hedge funds seeking control of CSX Corp. won the right to 
vote four directors onto CSX’s board; the incumbent board had sought to enjoin hedge 
funds’ voting power because, to evade disclosure requirements, they had purchased 
derivatives rather than shares).  The court found defendant hedge funds had amassed a 
large economic position in CSX through total return swaps rather than purchasing shares, 
in a scheme to avoid having to publicly disclose their large position until they were ready 
to mount a proxy fight.  Id. at 549–50.  A swap contract can be unwound at any time by 
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total return swaps, figured in the recent proxy fight at CSX Corp.137  
Routine hedging of the short swap positions vested a significant amount 
of voting power in parties who lacked the economic interest of bona fide 
shareholders.138 
                                                                                                             
agreement between the contracting parties; if settled in kind, rather than in cash, the long 
party obtains full ownership, including attached voting rights, of a large shareholding that 
has been accumulated in stealth.  Id. at 522–24. 
137 CSX, 562 F. Supp. at 516.  The swaps gave the hedge funds “substantially all of the 
indicia of stock ownership save the formal legal right to vote the shares.”  Id.  The court 
explained the total return swaps (TRSs) at issue: 
 For example, in a cash-settled TRS with reference to 100,000 
shares of the stock of General Motors, the short party agrees to pay to 
the long party an amount equal to the sum of (1) any dividends and 
cash flow, and (2) any increase in the market value that the long party 
would have realized had it owned 100,000 shares of General Motors.  
The long party in turn agrees to pay to the short party the sum of (1) 
the amount equal to interest that would have been payable had it 
borrowed the notional amount from the short party, and (2) any 
depreciation in the market value that it would have suffered had it 
owned 100,000 shares of General Motors. 
 In practical economic terms, a TRS referenced to stock places the 
long party in substantially the same economic position that it would 
occupy if it owned the referenced stock or security.  There are two 
notable exceptions.  First, since it does not have record ownership of 
the referenced shares, it does not have the right to vote them.  Second, 
the long party looks to the short party, rather than to the issuer of the 
referenced security for distributions and the marketplace for any 
appreciation in value. 
 The short party of course is in a different situation.  It is entitled 
to have the long party place it in the same economic position it would 
have occupied had it advanced the long party an amount equal to the 
market value of the referenced security.  But there are at least two 
salient distinctions, from the short party’s perspective, between a TRS 
and a loan.  First, the short party does not actually advance the 
notional amount to the long party.  Second, it is subject to the risk that 
the referenced asset will appreciate during the term of the TRS. . . . 
    . . . .  
 Institutions that hedge short TRS exposure by purchasing the 
referenced shares typically have no economic interest in the securities.  
They are, however, beneficial owners and thus have the right to vote 
the referenced shares. 
 Institutional voting practices appear to vary.  As noted below, 
some take the position that they will not vote shares held to hedge TRS 
risk.  Some may be influenced, at least in some cases, to vote as a 
counterparty desires.  Some say they vote as they determine in their 
sole discretion.  Of course, one may suppose that banks seeking to 
attract swap business well understand that activist investors will 
consider them to be more attractive counterparties if they vote in favor 
of the positions their clients advocate. 
Id. at 520–21, 522 (footnotes omitted). 
138 Id. at 522.  The court described how swaps misalign voting rights: 
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A shareholder is allowed to revoke or supersede a previously 
submitted proxy at any time before the polls close.139  In a contested 
election, especially a close one, beneficial owners commonly receive 
repeated proxy solicitations; either through confusion or because of a 
change of mind, some return voting instructions multiple times for the 
same shares.140  When an overvote or obvious duplication of proxies 
occurs, the tabulator or inspector of election should eliminate prior 
proxies and count only the last one.141  Multiple proxies create confusion 
that, if not resolved, can disqualify all of them.142 
Adding to the confusion, brokers and banks commonly return 
partial proxies that represent only some of the shares they are entitled to 
vote, submitting them incrementally as they receive voting instructions 
from their customers; because they represent the voting instructions of 
many beneficial owners, these proxies typically include combinations of 
For, Against, and Abstain votes.143  These proxies count cumulatively, 
but may include repetitive votes, or may, because of share lending, total 
more votes than the intermediary is entitled to vote.144  An intermediary 
must reconcile any overvote with the tabulator by making adjustments 
that remove votes from the final aggregated proxy—but the beneficial 
                                                                                                             
[T]he accumulation of substantial hedge positions significantly alters the 
corporate electorate.  It does so by (1) eliminating the shares constituting 
the hedge positions from the universe of available votes, (2) subjecting 
the voting of the shares to the control or influence of a long party that 
does not own the shares, or (3) leaving the vote to be determined by an 
institution that has no economic interest in the fortunes of the issuer, 
holds nothing more than a formal interest, but is aware that future 
swap business from a particular client may depend upon voting in the 
“right” way.  
Id. (emphasis added, footnotes omitted). 
 The court reviewed evidence that the hedge funds’ counterparties bought and sold 
CSX shares immediately before and after record dates in a pattern clearly calculated to 
secure dividend and voting rights  Id. at 544.  Although legal, these transactions 
contributed to an overall impression of manipulative conduct.  Cf. id. 
139 Magill v. N. Am. Refractories Co., 128 A.2d 233, 237 (Del. 1956) (stockholder may 
change his vote until the polls close). 
140 Obara, supra note 33, at 10-14 to 10-15 (it is not unusual for five proxies to be returned 
for a single position in a contested corporate election). 
141 Id. at 10-16. 
142 Williams v. Sterling Oil of Okla., Inc., 273 A.2d 264, 265 (Del. 1971) (“the inspectors of 
an election must reject all identical but conflicting proxies when the conflict cannot be 
resolved from the face of the proxies themselves or from the regular books and records of 
the corporation”).  Accord Concord Fin. Group, Inc. v. Tri-State Motor Transit Co. 567 A.2d 
1, 15–16 (Del. Ch. 1989). 
143 Obara, supra note 33, at 10-13.  Where the total eligible vote is not exceeded, all such 
proxies are counted.  See also Schott v. Climax Molybdenum Co., 154 A.2d 221, 223 (Del. Ch. 
1959) (stating same). 
144 See supra notes 120–123 and accompanying text. 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 44, No. 1 [2009], Art. 5
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol44/iss1/5
2009] Elephant in the Boardroom? 163 
owners will never know that some of their shares did not count, and if 
double-counting is offset by an undervote, it may go unremarked.145 
Although both the records at Cede & Co. and beneficial owners’ 
account statements purport to track a definite number of shares, and 
although counting votes requires definite numbers of shares, the 
underlying reality is that custodial accounts hold pro rata interests in a 
fungible mass of shares—shares that are in continual motion, being 
bought, sold, lent, and borrowed without being traceable to particular 
accounts.146  Reconciling vote counts to pro rata shares of a fungible mass 
is pointless, and nobody really tries.147  Because the net settlement 
system creates intraday discrepancies between a broker’s total holding at 
DTC and the sum of shares in its internal accounts, brokers have to 
adjust the number of shares their customers vote, in order to reconcile 
the total vote to whatever number of shares DTC held for the broker at 
the instant selected as the record date for the meeting.148 
Finally, ignoring the complex reality of voting, by law inspectors of 
election may examine only the legal proxy documents, as if they 
represented shareholders’ actual votes rather than votes that one or more 
intermediaries have aggregated and adjusted.149  Delaware law 
consistently considers inspectors’ powers and duties “purely ministerial, 
not quasi-judicial,” and emphasizes the value of an expeditious result 
over its accuracy.150 
These factors evidence a voting system and a process that is 
susceptible to both accidental and intentional miscounting of 
shareholders’ votes. 
                                                 
145 SEC, supra note 88 (in principle intermediaries are obliged to vote as instructed, but 
their diligence in doing so cannot be monitored).  See supra note 127 (stating same). If a 
broker or bank fails to reconcile an overvote or conflicting proxies, the inspector of election 
may disqualify some or all of the associated proxies, in effect disenfranchising multiple 
beneficial owners whose voting instructions were aggregated by the broker or bank.  See 
supra note 125 and accompanying text. 
146 See supra text accompanying notes 93–94. 
147 See supra note 94. 
148 See supra text accompanying notes 93–94, 121. 
149 Cf. DEL. CODE tit. 8 § 231(d) (2009).  Inspectors may use only information on the face of 
the proxy or the envelope and must accept anything that reasonably purports to be a valid 
proxy; they may not consider extrinsic evidence as to a proxy’s authority except to resolve 
broker overvotes.  Id. 
150 Williams v. Sterling Oil, 273 A.2d at 265 (describing duties of inspectors); DEL. CODE tit. 
8 § 225(a) (2009) (judicial inquiry into proxies and voting is reserved to the chancery court, 
upon suit by a shareholder with standing); Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 
668 (Del. Ch. 1988) (inspectors’ duties are conditioned by administrative need for 
expedition and certainty).  
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F. Direct Communication, Direct Registration 
In 2004, the Business Roundtable, in collaboration with Georgeson 
Shareholder Services, proposed changes to SEC rules, made possible by 
exploiting available technology that would alleviate problems in the 
current system of proxy communication.151  The proposed changes 
would enable proxy information and voting rights to move directly from 
issuers to beneficial owners, rather than “cascading down through 
successive layers of custodians” as is currently required for shares held 
“in street name.”152  Benefits to investors would include vote 
confirmation, an audit trail on votes cast, and eliminating the practice of 
brokers voting shares that they do not own; in addition, reducing 
complexity would eliminate some unnecessary costs.153 
An enabling infrastructure for eliminating (not merely immobilizing) 
paper stock certificates already exists and could be used to avoid the 
complexities of custodial relationships:  the Direct Registration System 
                                                 
151 See Bus. Roundtable, supra note 111, at 3, 10 (proposing changes to SEC rules); 
Georgeson Shareholder Communications, Inc., Re: Rule No. 4-493, Letter to SEC, 1–4 (May 
3, 2004), http://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/4-493/georgeson050304.pdf (supporting the 
Business Roundtable’s request for rule changes).  The proposal by the Business Roundtable 
and Georgeson related to a then-pending SEC rule change that would have enhanced 
shareholders’ access to the corporate proxy process.  SEC Release No. 34-48628, 68 Fed. 
Reg. 60784, 2003 WL 22350515 (Oct. 14, 2003).  This Rule 14a-11, not adopted then but 
newly re-proposed, would, under certain circumstances, require publicly traded companies 
to include shareholder nominees for director in the companies’ proxy materials unless state 
law or a company’s governing documents prohibit shareholders from nominating 
directors.  SEC Release Nos. 33-9046, 34-60089 (June 10, 2009), http://www.sec.gov/ 
rules/proposed/2009/33-9046.pdf.  In a related development, Delaware revised its General 
Corporate Law, effective August 1, 2009, empowering Delaware corporations to limit 
through bylaws shareholders’ ability to nominate director candidates, reimbursement of 
proxy expenses, etc.  DEL. CODE tit. 8 § 112 (2009). 
 See also Broadridge Financial Solutions, Inc., 2008 Proxy Season Key Statistics, 
http://www.broadridge.com/investor-communications/us/2008ProxyStats.pdf (over 79% 
of shares voted in the 2008 proxy season were voted via the internet-based ProxyEdge® 
service, which attests to investors’ ability and willingness to use electronic infrastructure in 
communications and transactions related to their shareholdings). 
152 Georgeson, supra note 151, at 1; Bus. Roundtable, supra note 111, at 12. 
153 Georgeson, supra note 151, at 3.  Vote confirmation would provide a safeguard against 
mistakes and fraud, and would allow fiduciaries to document how they have voted shares 
held in trust.  Id.  Audit trails would enable sorting out complexities of voting stock that 
has been loaned, and are essential if voting results are challenged legally.  Id.  The 
justification for broker discretionary voting—companies need it to avoid failed quorums 
even though it is patently anti-democratic—would vanish with effective direct 
communication to shareholders.  Id.  Benefits to issuers include reduction in the cost and 
time that proxy communication requires, and transparency as to who the shareholders are 
(although it eliminates the OBO/NOBO mechanism, the proposal allows for beneficial 
owners who require privacy to arrange nominee ownership at their own expense.)  Id. at 3–
4. 
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(“DRS”), operated by DTC, allows beneficial owners to register their 
shares electronically on the books of an issuer or its transfer agent, and to 
transfer them using DRS transactions.154  Registration of the shares 
assures direct communication between issuers and beneficial owners, 
and eliminates broker voting as well as the need for “fungible mass” 
accounting of shareholdings that leads to errors, discrepancies, and 
adjustments to voting instructions.155  However, for investors who trade 
frequently, or if prompt execution of trades is important, holding shares 
in DRS is less advantageous than holding “in street name”; brokers’ 
internal systems better meet their needs.156  DRS has been available since 
1996; all states’ laws now allow corporations to issue shares without 
paper certificates, and all U.S. stock exchanges require issuers to be 
capable of participating in the DRS; yet, despite the opportunity DRS 
offers to reduce complexity and errors, it is little used.157 
                                                 
154 See SEC, Holding Your Securities—Get the Facts, http://www.sec.gov/investor/ 
pubs/holdsec.htm; Securities Industry & Financial Markets Assn., Direct Registration System 
Educational Webinar, June 24, 2008, http://events.sifma.org/uploadedFiles/Events/2008/ 
DRSwebinar/DRSEdWebinar6-24-08.pdf (“DRS webinar”).  See also Joseph Trezza, Going 
Paperless in the Securities Industry:  Benefitting Issuers and Investors, CORP. SEC. & 
GOVERNANCE PROFESSIONAL 2–3 (newsletter, June 2007) (U.S. markets are catching up; 
dozens of countries’ securities markets have eliminated paper certificates over the last 
twenty years).  Even with the vast majority of share certificates now immobilized, the 
current volume of issuance and transfer of certificates costs the industry about $350 million 
annually, including $50 million to replace lost or stolen certificates; certificates worth $16 
billion were lost in the 9/11 World Trade Center disaster and had to be replaced at a cost of 
$300 million, whereas electronic records were preserved.  Id. at 3–4.  Securities Indus. & Fin. 
Markets Ass’n [SIFMA], Securities Industry Immobilization & Dematerialization Implementation 
Guide 18–22 (2008), www.sifma.org/services/techops/pdf/SIFMA-Dematerialization-
Guide.pdf-2008-10-27 (summarizing the costs of processing certificates and the benefits of 
DRS). 
155 See supra Part II.D.2 (indicating why DTC, owned by member firms in the securities 
industry, is unlikely ever to develop functionality in DRS that would compete effectively 
with brokerage firms’ street-name shareholding arrangements); see also SIFMA, 
Dematerialization Guide, supra note 154, at 32 (noting that brokerage firms prefer their clients 
to hold shares in street name). 
156 SEC, supra note 154.  Trading requires that shares first be transferred and re-registered 
to a broker, then traded; even though it is accomplished electronically, in a fast-moving 
market the time required by this extra step could have significant financial impact.  Id.  
Although issuers can buy and sell shares held in DRS, timing and price of transactions is 
entirely outside the investor’s control.  Id.  
157 SEC Release No. 37931, Order Granting Approval to Establish DRS (Nov. 7, 1996), 
[File No. SR-DTC-96-15] (approving establishment of DRS to provide cost-efficient 
transfers, prompt settlement of trades, and reduction in problems related to lost or stolen 
certificates); SEC Release No. 34-54289, Order Granting Approval to Mandate Listed 
Companies Become Eligible to Participate in DRS (Aug. 8, 2006), 71 Fed. Reg. 47278 (Aug. 
16, 2006) [File No. SR-NYSE-2006-29] (setting DRS implementation deadlines for issuers 
and exchanges, including final deadline for all listed stocks to achieve DRC compatibility 
by Jan. 2008, later extended to Mar. 2008).  See also SIFMA, DRS webinar, supra note 154 
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This Part reviewed the increasing incidence of contested corporate 
elections and the legal rules that govern the conduct of those elections—
rules based on presumptions about shareholding that clash in part with 
present-day realities.  Complex arrangements arose to relate actual share 
ownership and trading practices to legal presumptions and to enhance 
the efficiency and liquidity of securities markets, but the multiplicity of 
players and handoffs of information increased susceptibility to errors 
when law requires a shareholder vote.  Corporate directors have 
fiduciary duties to shareholders, but in relation to elections, those duties 
are enforced only by exception, to sanction blatant manipulation of the 
election process. 
III.  ANALYSIS 
Delaware law presumes a form of corporate election that once was 
common but today is obsolete for all but the smallest corporations:  an 
election with registered shareholders, simple proxy arrangements, in-
person attendance at the annual meeting, and an ability for shareholders 
to hold directors accountable.158  If the law’s presumption matched 
reality, counting the vote fairly and accurately would be simple; 
however, because most shares are today held “in street name” (which is 
essential to the efficiency and liquidity of today’s securities markets), the 
mechanisms provided under Delaware law are not conducive to an 
accurate vote count.159 
Part III.A focuses on the reasons why accurately counting 
shareholders’ votes matters.  Part III.B reviews how the street-name 
holding system’s complexity opens it to errors in counting the vote.  Part 
III.C reviews how technical solutions could reduce errors.  Part III.D 
focuses on the governance issues that determine confidence in corporate 
                                                                                                             
(detailing progress in dematerialization, cost savings, and the securities industry’s further 
goals for DRS). 
158 Greenwood, supra note 54; Dallas, supra note 28. 
159 Kahan & Rock, supra note 45, at 1248–49. 
The complexity of the custodial ownership system, combined with the 
pressure of numerous shareholder votes, creates a system that is far 
more complex and fragile than the one anticipated by the Delaware 
legal structure. There are somewhere around 17,000 reporting 
companies. Most of these companies are subject to the SEC proxy rules 
when they solicit proxies. Finally, annual meetings are seasonal, with 
most taking place during the second quarter of the calendar year. 
Broadridge delivers more than one billion communications to 
investors per year. It is an accident waiting to happen. 
Id. [footnotes omitted].  See also Prefatory Note to UCC § 8-101 (summarizing concisely 
differences between current reality and the shareholding and trading environment 
presumed by corporation law). 
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enterprises and the extent to which the courts have found any 
enforceable duty to count the vote accurately in corporate elections. 
A.  The Importance of the Shareholder Franchise 
In Blasius, Chancellor Allen stated that the shareholder franchise “is 
critical to the theory that legitimates the exercise of power by some 
(directors and officers) over vast aggregations of property that they do 
not own”160 and that “the prospect of losing a validly conducted 
shareholder vote cannot . . . constitute a legitimate threat to a corporate 
interest, at least if one accepts the traditional model of the nature of the 
corporation that sees shareholders as ‘owners.’”161  Specifically, the 
shareholder franchise is crucial to a balance of power between the board 
of directors and shareholders.162  In theory, shareholders’ economic 
interest as owners (or as residual claimants on the corporation’s earnings 
and assets) assures that this allocation of governance power is 
appropriately placed, but this alignment is by no means assured.163 
                                                 
160 Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659 (Del. Ch. 1988); Allen et al., supra 
note 15, at 1311 (“[T]he shareholders’ right to elect the corporation’s governing body is a 
fundamental, cardinal foundation of Delaware corporation law.”). 
161 Stahl v. Apple Bancorp, Inc., 579 A.25 1115, 1124 (Del. Ch. 1990) (board’s deferral of 
annual meeting in response to shareholder’s intent to conduct a proxy contest was 
reasonable to allow time for informing shareholders of issues).  The traditional view is that 
the law permits directors’ independence solely for the benefit of the true owners, 
shareholders, and limits directors’ autonomy by fiduciary duties, requirements that 
shareholders approve some decisions, and the right of shareholders to elect the directors.  
Julian Velasco, The Fundamental Rights of the Shareholder, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 407, 442 
(2006).  In contrast, the contractarian view is that the law assigns legitimating governance 
power to shareholders (among all interested constituencies) because as the residual 
claimant the shareholder has most at risk and thus has the strongest interest in assuring 
that directors will perform to maximize the wealth of all constituencies.  Id. at 446–47. 
162 See MM Cos. v. Liquid Audio, Inc., 813 A.2d 1118, 1127 (Del. 2002) (discussing a 
proper balance in the allocation of power between the stockholders’ right to elect directors 
and the board of directors’ right to manage the corporation); Allen et al., supra note 15, at 
1311 (“When directors intentionally act to thwart the right of the shareholders to remove 
them at the polls, they intrude upon basic statutory rights of the shareholders and upset the 
careful balance of power created by the Delaware General Corporation Law.”).  Some 
commentators view the shareholder franchise as a mechanism for correcting errors.  See 
supra note 14. 
163 Unitrin v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1380–81 (Del. 1995) (“[S]tockholders are 
presumed to act in their own best economic interests when they vote in a proxy contest.”).  
However, short selling, vote-buying, and derivative instruments and broker discretionary 
voting allow parties to vote shares without economic interest. See supra notes 136–38 and 
accompanying text; supra note 131 and accompanying text. 
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 B. The Current System Produces Errors 
Even though tabulation errors in corporate elections only rarely 
become the object of litigation, it is indisputable that the existing proxy 
system is error-prone—its complexity, the need for behind-the-scenes 
adjustment of the vote, and lack of verification assure a significant 
incidence of errors, and they create opportunities for abuse.164 
A number of key reasons follow: 
▪ Complex custodial relationships require multi-layer 
communication of proxy information and voting instructions.165 
▪ The collection and aggregation of voting instructions proceeds 
with no verification or audit trail, and is subject to adjustment in 
any case; unconstrained by law, custodians’ policies and 
practices differ.166 
▪ Over- and under-voting produce discrepancies that sometimes 
need to be resolved and sometimes mask disproportionate 
allocation of voting power.167 
▪ Because net settlement of transactions produces transient 
discrepancies in share counts, custodians assign and adjust votes 
(at least in part arbitrarily because verifiable facts are 
unavailable), and sometimes vote without instructions, to make 
the total vote count conform to the record total of shares they 
hold on behalf of various beneficial owners.168 
▪ Although common law obligates custodians to follow beneficial 
owners’ voting instructions, the inability to verify execution of 
voting instructions renders enforcement of fiduciary duty mostly 
infeasible.169 
▪ Legal vote-buying arrangements, derivative instruments, and 
short selling separate voting rights from economic interest and 
obscure who has voting rights.170 
▪ Rules for inspectors of election favor expeditious determination 
of the result over accuracy; but in close elections accuracy is 
crucial to the outcome.171 
                                                 
164 See supra notes 2–13 and accompanying text.  See also Kahan & Rock, supra note 45, at 
1249 (cataloguing three categories of voting “pathologies”—caused by complexity of the 
system, by confusions about ownership of shares, and by misalignment between voting 
rights and economic interests). 
165 Supra Part II.D. 
166 Supra note 119 and accompanying text. 
167 Supra notes 120–23, 139–42 and accompanying text. 
168 Supra notes 90, 122–23 and accompanying text.  
169 Supra notes 118–19 and accompanying text. 
170 Supra notes 132–38 and accompanying text. 
171 Supra notes 149–50 and accompanying text. 
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The vote count that tabulators and inspectors report in corporate 
elections is the sum of pro rata shares of multiple fungible masses held by 
custodians, arbitrarily adjusted by the custodians, who may untraceably 
add or subtract votes to fill any gaps.  In a close contest, could a 
reasonable person have confidence that such a tally accurately represents 
shareholders’ intent?  Delaware law does.  Rather than assuring a fair 
and accurate election process, it seems the law disregards manifest flaws 
in the corporate voting process—tolerating systematic bias and gross 
miscounts as mere errors, regrettable but insignificant. 
The dearth of case law concerning accuracy in counting the vote in 
corporate elections may relate to the presumption, noted above, that 
counting is a simple matter.172  Although errors in counting votes 
sometimes have figured in litigation, Delaware courts’ decisions have yet 
to define how or whether directors’ (or proxyholders’) fiduciary duties 
apply to obtaining an accurate vote count; although it is possible to glean 
or infer some principles from dicta, cases have been decided on other 
issues.173 
It is fair to ask:  how much accuracy is it reasonable to expect in 
elections conducted largely through proxies?  No definitive answer is 
possible, but it is germane to observe that modern corporations have 
many millions of shares outstanding, often held by shareholders large 
and small, in widely scattered accounts.  As in a civil election, every vote 
should count, but achieving perfect accuracy is neither feasible nor 
affordable.174  Delaware courts explicitly recognize the need for 
expeditious conclusion of elections and finality of results, and weigh 
                                                 
172 Supra note 158.  But cf. In re Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc., 954 A.2d 346, 374–79 (Del. 
Ch. 2008) (plaintiff’s claim that incorrect tabulation of votes meant shareholders had not 
validly approved a merger withstood defendants’ motion for summary judgment). 
173 E.g., Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 663–67 (Del. Ch. 1988) (reciting 
problems counting consents and revocations, the court found inspectors made errors in 
counting, and concluded that both sides in the contest nevertheless must accept as final the 
totals the inspectors had announced); In re Transkaryotic, 954 A.2d at 355–56 (discussing 
problems in eliminating possible duplicate proxies, finding a question of material fact 
sufficient to defeat summary judgment motion). 
174 In a criminal prosecution of tampering with a union election, the court commented: 
In any election, public or private, involving more than a minimal 
number of voters or ballots, a rule requiring the government to prove 
that an alternative outcome would have ensued had the election been 
untainted would render the victors’ offices and emoluments virtually 
invulnerable  . . . There are simply too many variables, and it would 
give the defendants the benefit of too many unknowns that are truly 
unknowables.  Proof beyond a reasonable doubt has never required 
proof to a mathematical certainty. 
United States v. DeFries, 909 F. Supp. 13, 17 (D.D.C. 1995), rev’d on other grounds, 129 F.3d 
1293 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
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these goals against protection of the franchise—redounding usually to 
the advantage of incumbent directors and management.175  Even 
allowing that some margin of error is unavoidable in practice, a system 
that can produce a miscount amounting to 20% of the total vote—as in 
the 2008 Yahoo annual meeting—intuitively is not sufficiently 
accurate.176  And the view articulated in In re Transkaryotic, that a court 
can by definition offer no remedy once an irreparable harm has occurred, 
leaves shareholders without either equitable or legal relief.177 
C. Technology Could Help—a Little 
Technology-enabled changes to the proxy voting process, along the 
lines proposed in 2004 by the Business Roundtable and Georgeson 
Shareholder Communications, could improve accuracy and streamline 
the process.178 
Transparency of ownership would open direct communication 
between issuers and beneficial owners, enabling issuers to better 
understand who the owners are.179  Direct communication would 
eliminate most of the handoffs in proxy dissemination and voting, 
reducing delays.180  Every handoff eliminated removes an opportunity to 
lose or distort information; the proposed change would significantly 
reduce errors.181  Reducing or eliminating handoffs that now occur 
between the beneficial owner and the inspector of election would enable 
confirmation of votes as well as direct validation of proxies, providing a 
safeguard against mistakes and fraud.182 
By eliminating intermediaries’ aggregation and adjustment steps, the 
process of reconciling multiple proxies from the same beneficial owner 
                                                 
175 Supra note 150 and accompanying text; see, e.g., Concord Fin. Group, Inc. v. Tri-State 
Motor Transit Co. 567 A.2d 1, 6 (Del. Ch. Sept. 6, 1989) (policy against shareholder 
disenfranchisement is counterbalanced by need for finality in corporate elections).  But cf. 
Allison v. Preston, 651 A.2d 772, 777 (Del. Ch. 1994) (upholding the policy against 
disenfranchising beneficial owners, for the benefit of incumbent directors whom election 
had ousted, by reversing election inspectors’ routine proxy-counting decisions because 
obligatory rather than voluntary nominee ownership of pension fund’s shares, required by 
ERISA, meant beneficial owners did not accept risk of agent’s misfeasance ordinarily 
associated with nominee ownership). 
176 See supra note 25 (describing expectations surrounding a democratic vote). 
177 954 A.2d at 361 (Del. Ch. 2008) (granting summary judgment to defendant directors 
where plaintiffs alleged disclosure violations tainted the vote that narrowly approved a 
merger). 
178 Supra Part II.F.  
179 Georgeson, supra note 151, at 2; Bus. Roundtable, supra note 111, at 7–9, 12. 
180 Georgeson, supra note 151, at 1–2; Bus. Roundtable, supra note 111, at 9. 
181 Georgeson, supra note 151, at 3; Bus. Roundtable, supra note 111, at 12; Donald, supra 
note 85, at 33. 
182 Georgeson, supra note 151, at 3; Bus. Roundtable, supra note 111, at 12. 
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(both partial proxies and proxies revoking earlier ones) would be simple, 
traceable, and verifiable—rather than being untraceable after being 
aggregated with others; voting would be auditable, although some 
adjustment to discrepancies in the fungible mass might still be 
required.183 
Discontinuation of discretionary broker voting, which the Business 
Round Table and Georgeson recommended and which soon will be in 
effect, means the vote count will better reflect the true wishes of voting 
shareholders who have a genuine economic interest.184  The changes 
proposed by the Business Round Table and Georgeson would reduce 
overall system cost by allowing elimination of some back-office work at 
many intermediaries.185  The changes also would allocate the cost burden 
of OBO confidentiality to those investors who desire and benefit from 
it.186  The further step of linking beneficial owners’ accounts to DRS 
(which might be accepted if implemented with powers of attorney for 
brokers) would simplify custodial relationships, but would remove share 
lending as a revenue source for brokerages.187 
Certain significant obstacles would need to be overcome.  Various 
parties—brokers, Broadridge, and others—collect fees for performing the 
services that make the current complex system work, and stand to lose 
significant revenue.188  Because custodians have no incentive to give up 
their control over account information or proxy voting, but exercise 
significant influence over rules set by self-regulating organizations like 
DTC and stock exchanges, there is little prospect of change to the status 
quo ante.189  Finally, although applying technology could alleviate errors, 
could reduce opportunities to manipulate the vote, and could improve 
efficiency, it has no bearing on whether anyone has legal accountability 
for accurately counting the vote. 
D. Suspect Motives and Biased Procedures 
Plainly, in any contested election or change-of-control decision, and 
sometimes even in uncontested director elections, the board is an 
interested party for whom the temptation to exploit any advantage is 
                                                 
183 Georgeson, supra note 151, at 3. 
184 Georgeson, supra note 151, at 3; Bus. Roundtable, supra note 111, at 7; SEC, supra note 
101. 
185 Georgeson, supra note 151, at 2. 
186 Id. 
187 Supra notes 154–57 and accompanying text. 
188 Donald, supra note 86, at 63–64. 
189 Supra text accompanying note 128; note 155. 
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present.190  Regardless of whether we believe the shareholder franchise 
legitimates the separation of control from ownership, or merely 
acknowledge that statutes call for shareholders to vote, it is an 
unfortunate practical necessity that an interested party, the board of 
directors, conducts the process by which shareholders exercise their 
voting powers.191   
Courts have nullified or formally rescinded legal board action when 
it was taken for an inequitable purpose.192  If board action effectively 
thwarts shareholders’ right to vote, a court can apply Blasius scrutiny—
but the plaintiff must first prove the board’s primary purpose was to 
impede the vote, a difficult burden that plaintiffs seldom can 
overcome.193  The courts set aside elections if overt intentional 
manipulation of election machinery is proven, but seldom have they 
held an individual accountable for having a role in such manipulation.194  
                                                 
190 Supra note 26.  Short of purposeful manipulation of the vote, a contested election or 
change-of-control transaction allows directors’ motives to be questioned but does not 
invoke conflict-of-interest treatment as in cases involving usurpation of corporate 
opportunity or freeze-out mergers. 
191 See supra note 84; see also Velasco, supra note 27, at 659 (arguing that courts should 
respect the balance of power established in corporate law and disallow protection of the 
business judgment rule if board action impinges on shareholders’ rights).  Although DEL. 
CODE tit. 8 § 141(a) (2009) authorizes the board of directors to manage the corporation’s 
business and affairs, the routine conduct of business affairs does not encompass the 
election of directors or fundamental decisions concerning disposition of shareholders’ 
property; it seems incongruous that the board of directors, having a potential conflict of 
interest in such matters, should enjoy control over the voting mechanism. 
192 Lerman, 421 A.2d 906 (Del. Ch. 1980) (inequitable conduct does not require an evil or 
selfish motive). 
193 See supra notes 71–75 and accompanying text on the Blasius standard and its relation to 
Unocal analysis.  See also Giuricich v. Emtrol Corp., 449 A.2d 232, 239 (Del. 1982) (willful 
perpetuation of a shareholder deadlock, resulting in board’s entrenchment, frustrated a 
50% shareholder’s voting rights and justified court’s appointment of a custodian); accord 
MM Cos. v. Liquid Audio, Inc., 813 A.2d 1118, 1127 (Del. 2003) (board that enlarged its 
membership to impede proxy fight for control was held to Blasius standard of compelling 
justification); Velasco, supra note 27, at 617 (noting the superficiality of the Unocal test in 
practice—nearly anything counts as a threat and nearly any response, if not preclusive or 
coercive of the vote, is deemed reasonable). 
194 See supra notes 71–72; see also Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368 (Del. 1996) (shareholder 
vote may be invalidated if wrongfully coerced, i.e., if shareholders were led to vote on 
some basis other than the merits of the transaction); Linton v. Everett,  No. Civ. A. 15219, 
1997 WL 441189 (Del. Ch. July 31, 1997) (setting aside election where directors issued new 
shares to themselves and effectively precluded opportunity for nomination of an 
alternative slate of board candidates).  But cf. Portnoy v. Cryo-Cell Int’l, Inc., 940 A.2d 43 
(Del. Ch. 2008) (holding incumbent board’s secret vote-buying arrangement and 
manipulative conduct of annual meeting were inequitable conduct, the court set aside 
corporate election and ordered a new election with expense to be borne by defendant 
incumbents).  The newly-enacted amendment to § 225 grants the Court of Chancery power 
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Sometimes the courts shield management from the limited statutory 
power of shareholders in ways that seem to “upset the careful balance of 
power.”195  Arguably, the fact that the law allocates to shareholders the 
power to vote on certain questions entails shareholders’ legal right to 
expect an accurate count of the vote, a right that should be enforceable 
on those who are entrusted with conducting the election and counting 
the vote.196  In In re MONY Group, Inc. Shareholder Litigation, Vice 
Chancellor Lamb noted that in the context of elections, directors’ duties 
are largely ministerial, and in Malone v. Brincat, the Delaware Supreme 
Court emphasized that directors’ fiduciary duties include the duty to 
deal with shareholders honestly, not only in required disclosures but in 
all things—which presumably includes all aspects of conducting a 
corporate election.197  Even when a court enforces shareholders’ 
unimpeded right to vote effectively, the decision means little without an 
assurance that shareholders’ votes will be counted accurately:  without 
an accurate count, the vote is not effective.198   
                                                                                                             
to remove directors to avoid irreparable harm (but only after a felony conviction or breach-
of-loyalty judgment related to directorial misconduct).  77 Del. Laws ch. 14 § 10 (2009). 
195 Allen et al., supra note 15, at 1311.  See, e.g., Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 
571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990) (upholding board’s action when, facing threat of a hostile tender 
offer, it restructured a pending merger as an acquisition to obviate need for shareholders’ 
approval); Unitrin v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995) (the court found 
substantive coercion, essentially shareholders’ inability to recognize or understand their 
true economic interest, a sufficient reason to justify denying a vote to shareholders).  A 
striking recent example is the Delaware Chancery Court’s decision to allow a New York 
court to rule on a question of Delaware law in In re Bear Stearns Cos., Inc. S’holder Litig., 
No. Civ. A. 3643-VCP, 2008 WL 959992 (Del.Ch. Apr. 9, 2008) (allowing a merger to 
proceed where issuance of new stock to the acquirer transparently eliminated shareholders’ 
statutory right to an uncoerced vote on the merger); see Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, How 
to Prevent Hard Cases from Making Bad Law: Bear Stearns, Delaware, and the Strategic Use of 
Comity, 58 Emory L. J. 713 (2009) (arguing that allowing a New York court to decide left 
Delaware case law undisturbed and avoided a “showdown” with powerful federal 
government officials who had brokered the deal).   
196 See supra note 25 (discussing the expectation of an accurate vote count in any 
democratic process). 
197 In re MONY Group, Inc. S’holder Litig., 853 A.2d 661, 675 (Del. Ch. 2004); Malone v. 
Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 10 (Del. 1998); supra note 38 and accompanying text.  In Malone the 
court reasoned that “directors have definitive guidance in discharging their fiduciary duty 
[of disclosure] by an analysis of the factual circumstances relating to the specific 
shareholder action being requested and an inquiry into the potential for deception or 
misinformation.”  Id. at 12.  By similar reasoning, if fiduciary duties extend to fairness in 
the manner of conducting an election, directors could obtain definitive guidance by 
analyzing circumstances relating to the proxy-handling and voting process and inquiry 
into the potential for bias or error in counting the votes. 
198 MM Cos., 813 A.2d at 1127 (Del. 2003); SEC, Unofficial Transcript of Roundtable on 
Proxy Voting Mechanics 3 (May 24, 2007)), http://www.sec.gov/news/openmeetings/ 
2007/openmtg_trans052407.pdf (in opening remarks, SEC Chairman Christopher Cox 
stated that voting is of little value if the vote is not counted accurately). 
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In a quantitative empirical study of corporate elections, Professor 
Yair Listokin found that proposals sponsored by management are 
“overwhelmingly more likely to win . . . by a very small amount than to 
lose by a very small amount—to a degree that cannot occur by 
chance.”199  This pattern apparently results because management, using 
the significant advantage conferred by real-time information from 
Broadridge and its control over when to close the polls, is able to engage 
in last-minute proxy campaigning just sufficient to obtain the outcome it 
wants.200 
This Note detailed the many ways in which customary practice and 
the law confer significant advantages to a corporation’s incumbent board 
of directors in any contest, and how meager are the means available to 
shareholders to assert or defend their statutory governance rights.201  
Because the frailties and design of the proxy communication and voting 
process tend to favor incumbent boards over other interests, built-in bias 
may impair the legitimacy of an election even in the absence of overt 
manipulation by the board.202  As Chancellor Allen observed in a 
different situation of built-in bias, “it is hard to imagine that a valid 
corporate purpose is served by perpetuating a structure that removes 
from the public shareholders the practical power to elect directors other 
than those supported by management.”203 
Ought the courts enforce a stricter standard of fiduciary duty when 
the integrity of the voting process is at stake, including the not-as-
simple-as-it-seems counting of the vote?  By judicial interpretation, the 
duty of care pertains to diligence in making business decisions and so is 
not germane to assuring integrity of the vote.204  The duty of loyalty is 
implicated only in overt self-dealing for pecuniary gain, and would not 
apply to conducting an election.205  Among the three primary fiduciary 
duties, the partly-defined duty of good faith remains as the only likely 
means of protecting the voting process.206  According to Professor 
Stone’s view of the context-dependency of the duty of good faith: 
                                                 
199 Listokin, supra note 37, at 4. 
200 Id. at 25–26, 29.  For examples of such manipulation, see supra notes 36–37 and 
accompanying text. 
201 Supra Parts II.A, II.C. 
202 Supra Part III.B. 
203 Speiser v. Baker, 525 A.2d 1001, 1012 (Del. Ch. 1987) (denying motion for judgment on 
the pleadings where plaintiff director sought to vote shares, held by a subsidiary, sufficient 
to control the parent corporation). 
204 Supra Part II.C.1. 
205 Supra Part II.C.2. 
206 Supra Part II.C.5. 
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[T]he board subverts the purpose of its coordinating 
power if it uses that power to determine the outcome of 
decisions allocated to collective shareholder action.  The 
board holds that power to facilitate decisions that 
express the shareholders’ preferences, not to manipulate 
the voting to achieve predetermined results.  Actions 
taken for the purpose of manipulating the outcome of a 
collective shareholder action are, in this context, taken in 
bad faith.207  
In Delaware jurisprudence, a failure in the duty of good faith 
removes protection of the business judgment rule and other exculpatory 
provisions, exposing directors to potential liability.208  What is needed to 
protect the integrity of elections is an affirmative duty that—like the 
duty of disclosure—is triggered when a board requests shareholder 
action and has responsibility to administer the process by which 
shareholders’ rights are exercised. 
In some cases courts have focused attention on the effectiveness of the 
shareholder vote rather than inquire into the board’s subjective purpose, 
subjecting even board inaction to judicial scrutiny.209  An effectiveness 
standard—a duty to assure that election mechanisms allow shareholders’ 
votes to have full effect—would comport well with the statutory 
reservation of certain decisions to shareholders’ vote and the view that 
directors have a duty to deal honestly and with scrupulous fairness 
toward shareholders.210  If a court may nullify an otherwise valid vote 
because an overt purposeful action caused shareholders to vote in a 
certain way for reasons other than the merits of the issue, the court 
presumably may equally nullify a vote if something in the voting process 
                                                 
207 Stone, supra note 54, at 926.  Cf. Blasius Indus. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659 (Del. 
Ch. 1988) (“[M]atters involving the integrity of the shareholder voting process involve 
consideration not present in any other context in which directors exercise delegated 
power.”). 
208 See supra notes 76–78. 
209 See Lerman v. Diagnostic Data, Inc., 421 A.2d 906 (Del. Ch. 1980) (court held invalid a 
bylaw, otherwise lawful, that prevented a shareholder from waging a proxy contest); 
Giuricich v. Emtrol Corp., 449 A.2d 232, 239 (Del. 1982) (willful perpetuation of a 
shareholder deadlock, resulting in board’s entrenchment, frustrated a 50% shareholder’s 
voting rights and justified court’s appointment of a custodian); Hubbard v. Hollywood 
Park Realty Enters., Inc., No. Civ. A. 11779, 1991 WL 3151 (Del. Ch., Jan. 14, 1991),(when an 
advance-notice bylaw kept a competing slate of director candidates off the election ballot, 
court ordered waiver of the bylaw, applying Schnell and Lerman rather than Blasius; the 
court equated inaction with action in the circumstances and commented “occasions do 
arise where board inaction, even where not inequitable in purpose or design, may 
nonetheless operate inequitably”).  Id. at *10.  See also supra note 42. 
210 Supra Part III.A. 
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has the effect of causing votes to be counted other than the way 
shareholders actually voted on the merits of the issue.211  In this context, 
where directors’ contextually-defined role is (in contradistinction to 
making business decisions) solely to effectuate shareholders’ governance 
rights, their passive acquiescence in an inequitable effect or result cannot 
properly fulfill an affirmative fiduciary duty.212  In conducting the 
election, it matters not at all what (disputable) vision the directors have 
of the corporation’s best interest:  the right to decide belongs to 
shareholders.  And so it is reasonable to argue that if corporate directors 
fail to mitigate known faults in the election process—faults that 
foreseeably may, and sometimes do, produce an inaccurate and possibly 
inequitable result—a court could find they consciously disregard a 
known responsibility, they fail to act in the face of a known duty to act; 
that is, they breach their duty of good faith.213   
IV.  CONTRIBUTION 
This Part proposes an Effective Voting Rule—complementary to the 
business judgment rule—that would protect shareholders’ statutory 
power to make informed decisions in specified circumstances.  Like 
disclosure duties, the Effective Voting Rule would apply any time a 
board requests shareholder action. 
First, this Part reviews the rationale and legislative intent of the 
corporate governance scheme embodied in Delaware’s General 
Corporation Law, concluding that stronger protection for the powers 
allocated to shareholders would enhance legitimacy without weakening 
directors’ allocated powers.  Second, it describes the force of the Effective 
Voting Rule, the conditions that trigger its application, and its 
consistency with other rules of law.  Third, it projects how the rule 
would stimulate development and implementation of methods for 
handling and counting proxies that would improve accuracy and 
perceived legitimacy of corporate elections.  Fourth, it addresses 
                                                 
211 Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d at 1382–83.  See supra note 42, discussing decisions in 
which the court intervened to nullify boards’ actions taken without specific manipulative 
intent or to enjoin board action where inaction produced an inequitable result. 
212 Hubbard, 1991 WL 3151.  See also supra notes 82–84 and accompanying text on the 
purpose of a board’s coordinating powers. 
213 See supra notes 76–77.  Following Linton, scienter need not be proved.  Linton v. 
Everett, No. Civ. A. 15219, 1997 WL 441189, at *9 (Del. Ch. July 31, 1997).  Contra Brehm v. 
Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 256 (Del. 1998) (holding that aspirational ideals of corporate 
governance are not required by law).  This principle is recognized in New York law:  “[A 
director] shall not be considered to be acting in good faith if he has knowledge concerning 
the matter in question that would cause . . . reliance [on officers, employees, outside 
experts, or board committees] to be unwarranted.”  N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 717(a)(3) (2003). 
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corollary matters that would require attention to optimize potential 
benefits from the Effective Voting Rule. 
Delaware’s General Corporation Law reserves routine business 
decision-making exclusively to the board of directors, but reserves to 
shareholders collectively the power to elect directors and approve 
fundamental changes.214  The evident legislative (or contractual) intent of 
this implied bargain, in which shareholders’ power to elect or remove 
directors legitimates the directors’ control over corporate resources, is 
that directors and shareholders should each exercise their respective 
powers without interference.215  Case precedent promises to 
shareholders the “unimpeded right to vote effectively”; this right 
demands more comprehensive protection than merely sanctioning 
actions taken with the “primary purpose” to thwart the vote (with the 
burden placed on aggrieved shareholders to prove directors’ 
subjective—and primary—intent).216  Just as the business judgment rule 
protects directors’ and managers’ autonomy in exercising their allocated 
powers, a complementary legal doctrine should protect the power 
allocated to shareholders.  Then-Vice Chancellor Jacobs observed in 
Hubbard that “[t]o allow for voting while maintaining a closed candidate 
selection process . . . renders the former an empty exercise”;217 if so, then 
surely it is likewise an empty exercise to allow for voting while 
maintaining a demonstrably unreliable vote-counting process. 
Born of practical necessity, boards play a ministerial role when 
shareholders exercise their powers.218  To protect shareholders’ allocated 
powers, a proposed Effective Voting Rule would impose on directors an 
affirmative duty, when conducting a corporate election, to ensure the 
                                                 
214 Supra section II.A. 
215 See supra section II.A.  The statutes that allocate powers to shareholders and to 
directors presumably are of equal dignity and independent legal significance. 
216 Velasco, supra note 27, advocates applying Blasius scrutiny to any intent, not only a 
primary purpose, to interfere with voting rights.  See Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 
A.2d 651, 652 (Del. Ch. 1988) (board action having “primary purpose” to impede 
shareholders’ action breached fiduciary duty); MM Cos. v. Liquid Audio, Inc., 813 A.2d 
1118, 1127 (Del. 2003) (“unimpeded right to vote effectively”).  As noted supra note 81, 
enforcement of the disclosure duty under SEC Rule 14a-9, forbidding false or misleading 
information in proxy statements issued in anticipation of shareholder voting, does not 
require proof of knowledge or intent. 
217 Hubbard, 1991 WL 3151, at *6. 
218 The duty of arranging for and conducting meetings of shareholders is assigned to 
boards not because this function benefits from directors’ discretionary judgment about the 
best interests of the corporation but because collective shareholder action cannot occur 
without coordination and nobody else is positioned to provide it.  To apply the business 
judgment rule in these circumstances invites the board to intrude on shareholders’ powers 
with a promise of impunity.  See supra notes 84–86 and accompanying text. 
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unimpaired effectiveness of shareholders’ voting power.219  Effective 
voting is defined as voting that is (1) informed by appropriate disclosure 
of material information, (2) fair in providing a reasonable opportunity for 
competing candidates or proposals to be considered, and (3) accurate in 
tabulating votes rightfully cast by beneficial owners.  Like the disclosure 
duty, the proposed Effective Voting Rule applies any time a board 
requests shareholder action.  It obligates directors to arrange all 
procedures that are material to effective shareholder action with honesty 
and scrupulous fairness; because proxy tabulation procedures can 
determine the outcome of a close contest, their materiality is beyond 
dispute.  The rule supplements the board’s duty to disclose all available 
material information and partakes of the same rationale:  that statutory 
shareholder action should be an informed decision—that is, both informed 
and a decision.220  Grounded in the duty of good faith—action or inaction 
that impairs the fairness and accuracy of the vote count would 
demonstrate conscious disregard of a board’s responsibilities—the 
Effective Voting Rule removes from ministerial acts in conducting an 
election the protection of the business judgment rule and any 
exculpatory bylaw under section 102(b)(7).221  Depending on factual 
circumstances, remedies could include injunctive relief or monetary 
damages. 
The Effective Voting Rule doctrine would in no way diminish a 
board’s ability (or duty) to inform or persuade shareholders in 
anticipation of the vote, but it would require due care and good faith in 
providing for a fair and accurate voting process—which shareholders 
cannot provide for themselves and which the board oversees as a 
ministerial duty. 
The Effective Voting Rule significantly strengthens protection of 
shareholders’ statutory powers, but is consistent with key decisions in 
                                                 
219 The Delaware Supreme Court promised in 1982 that “careful judicial scrutiny will be 
given a situation in which the right to vote for the election of successor directors has been 
effectively frustrated and denied[.]”  Giuricich v. Emtrol Corp., 449 A.2d 232, 239 (Del. 
1982); see also Stone, supra note 54 at 924.  The board needs flexibility for making business 
decisions, but conducting corporate elections is not part of business decision-making.  In 
this context, strict enforcement of fiduciary duty is consistent with statutes that prevent 
abuse (for instance, strict rules regulating the frequency of calling annual meetings, 
determining eligibility to vote, and the timing and content of required disclosures).  Id. at 
919. 
220 See supra section II.C.6 on the duty of disclosure. 
221 Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 369–70 (Del. 2006) (if directors act not in good faith, 
protections of an exculpatory charter provision do not attach); see DEL. CODE tit. 8 
§ 102(b)(7) (2009) (allowing charter provisions exculpating directors for duty-of-care 
liability); see also id. § 145 (2009) (allowing indemnification of directors, officers, and others, 
but not if they act in bad faith). 
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which Delaware courts have analyzed directors’ fiduciary duties to 
shareholders.  The Moran v. Household International, Inc., decision 
announced that Delaware Law would not countenance “subversion of 
corporate democracy by manipulation of corporate machinery.”222  In 
both Aprahamian and Blasius, the court declined to apply the business 
judgment rule where purposeful board action impaired shareholders’ 
voting rights.223  In In re Topps Co. Shareholder Litigation, the court 
invalidated board actions that biased the voting process.224  In Hubbard v. 
Hollywood Park Realty Enterprises, the court did not allow a board to take 
passive advantage of a bylaw that operated inequitably against insurgent 
shareholders.225  In In re Walt Disney Company Derivative Litigation and in 
Stone v. Ritter, the courts stated that deliberate indifference and inaction 
in the face of a duty to act can constitute bad faith, removing protection 
of the business judgment rule.226  Finally, in Mercier v. Inter-Tel the court 
held that postponing an election to allow shareholders to consider new 
information and the board’s advice was consistent with fiduciary duties 
so long as it did not impede or coerce the shareholders’ vote.227 
Implementing the Effective Voting Rule would create an incentive 
for directors to contract with Broadridge (or other providers) for 
verifiably fair and accurate proxy-handling and tabulation services.  
Even without difficult-to-measure damages, an increased risk of having 
to repeat the expensive proxy and election process would encourage 
accuracy; and courts could require directors who fail in their duty to 
assure a fair and accurate vote count to bear the cost of a new election, as 
the court did in Portnoy v. Cryo-Cell International, Inc.228  Under such 
pressure the securities industry undoubtedly would implement hitherto 
neglected technical and procedural improvements.  And if Delaware 
implements the rule, its direct jurisdiction and indirect influence 
practically ensure that fair and accurate proxy voting will become the 
industry standard. 
                                                 
222 490 A.2d 1059, 1080 (Del. Ch. 1985); see supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
223 Aprahamian v. HBO & Co., 531 A.2d 1204, 1206–07 (Del. Ch. 1987); Blasius Indus., Inc. 
v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659 (Del. Ch. 1988).  See supra Section II.C.4 on anti-takeover 
defenses. 
224 926 A.2d 58, 84–93 (Del. Ch. 2007).  See supra Section II.A. 
225  Hubbard v. Hollywood Park Realty Enterprises, No. Civ A. 11779, 1991 WL3151 (Del. 
Ch. Jan. 14, 1991). 
226 907 A.2d 693, 754–55 (Del. Ch. 2005); 911 A.2d 362, 369, 372 (Del. 2006).  See supra note 
76 and accompanying text; section II.C.5 on the duty of good faith. 
227 929 A.2d at 813.  
228 Portnoy v. Cryo-Cell Int’l, Inc., 940 A.2d 43 (Del. Ch. 2008) (holding incumbent 
board’s secret vote-buying arrangement and manipulative conduct of annual meeting were 
inequitable conduct, the court set aside corporate election and ordered new election with 
expense to be borne by defendant incumbents). 
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As a corollary matter, the Effective Voting Rule may require 
narrowing the application of section 141(e) of the General Corporation 
Law, which protects directors from liability when they rely on reports or 
information from persons they reasonably believe to have expert or 
professional competence.229  Although such protection is appropriate 
when directors make business decisions, a board should not escape 
accountability for ministerial acts merely by relying on outside service 
providers to administer portions of the election process. 
A second corollary matter is the current unenforceability of the 
proxyholder’s duty, as agent for the beneficial owner, to vote according 
to instructions.  Current law affords no remedy for such failure, 
regardless of the reason, treating it as a voluntarily incurred risk.  
Because street-name shareholding is the predominant practice, courts 
should acknowledge that most beneficial owners must vote their shares 
through proxies.  Given this factual reality, courts should enforce 
proxyholders’ duty under agency law to vote according to the beneficial 
owner’s instructions, reversing the voluntary-assumption-of-risk 
precedents.  As with directors under the Effective Voting Rule, if 
proxyholders faced potential liability, the securities industry would 
promptly hold Broadridge accountable to provide verifiable and 
auditable proxy voting—or a competing service provider would emerge 
to satisfy the need.230 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Until recent years close corporate elections were rare; voting usually 
was so lopsided that any errors in the count were of no consequence.  
But since the 1980s, defensive responses to hostile takeovers and 
shareholder activism have generated frequent proxy contests, often with 
close decisions.  Boards are interested parties in proxy contests, and they 
are able to influence the vote through scheduling of elections, control of 
the annual meeting’s agenda and chair, and other measures that 
disadvantage an opposing faction. 
Intentional miscounting of proxy votes (or ballot box stuffing) by a 
board, if proven, would not be a reasonable or proportionate defensive 
measure under Unocal/Unitrin doctrine, and would not find a compelling 
justification under Blasius.  However, despite the statutory allocation to 
                                                 
229 See supra note 61. 
230 Because it is conducted through extensive use of mail and electronic communications, 
the proxy process obviously is within the purview of federal mail fraud and wire fraud 
statutes.  In an extreme case it is conceivable that facts could arise that would support 
racketeering charges against directors or parties handling proxies on an “honest services” 
theory—as has occurred in the case of tampering with union elections.  See supra note 43. 
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shareholders of governance power that legitimates a board’s powers, 
Delaware courts have tolerated a system of voting that allows the 
outcome of corporate elections to be determined by means other than a 
fair and accurate count of shareholders’ votes.  First, the complex proxy 
system gives an advantage to incumbent boards and their proposals.  
Second, proxy tabulation is prone to errors—through which 
shareholders’ votes may be rejected or even cast against their express 
instructions.  Neither boards, nor their attorneys, nor the courts can 
credibly claim ignorance of the problems. 
Troubling questions arise.  How can a board claim legitimacy for its 
continuing control of the corporation, or for ratification of a transaction 
that requires shareholders’ approval, if it has good reason to suspect 
serious flaws in the procedures by which it obtains shareholders’ 
statutorily required approval?  Do boards have an affirmative fiduciary 
duty to conduct fair elections, and is that duty breached when a board 
passively allows biased voting procedures to work in its favor?  If so, 
should a board be able to escape its responsibility for conducting fair 
elections merely by the expedient of engaging outside providers for 
proxy communication and tabulation services? 
This Note assumes that the expectation of accurate counting is 
fundamental to any kind of democratic election, and that the legitimacy 
of corporate elections is important to sustain trust in the public 
corporations that dominate economic life.  Where the law grants 
shareholders a vote, assuring an accurate vote count is obligatory.  
Because boards conduct corporate elections even though they are 
interested in the outcome, the law should obligate them to use 
demonstrably fair and accurate election procedures.   
The proposed Effective Voting Rule would impose an affirmative 
duty on boards to assure fair and accurate elections.  When a board’s role 
is to provide the mechanism for shareholders to exercise their statutory 
rights, rather than to exercise its own business discretion, the business 
judgment rule should not apply.  The Effective Voting Rule proposed 
here builds on Delaware precedents but strengthens the interpretation of 
directors’ fiduciary duties in the special context of facilitating a decision 
that the law allocates to shareholders.  By doing so, it might strengthen 
the real and perceived legitimacy of corporate enterprises. 
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